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CHAPTER I
THE PROBLEM

ren years before John Locke's

'§§s~

tqncgrnins Hyman Und!c!\andins received

even its first rough form, the author's pen had been at work jotting down a
group of essays on natural law.

He never bothered to publish the essays, nor

did anyone else unti I almost three ftl! i centuries later.

In 1954, Wolfgang von

leyden, using the authoritative Lovelace collection of Locke's work. edited
these Essays .2!!

~qe

.bm! 2! NI\Ure,

Just why Locke never published these essays is unknown.
several plausible reasons.'

Von Leyden offers

But Whatever the reasons, the essays would certain

Iy not have caused the stir that his

~!iiax.

Conc!rqins Human Understanding did;

and they have not been heralded as prtceless dIscoveries even

not/.

Their

appearance in Locke's time would have aroused little excitement because few
people then doubted the exIstence or knowability of the natural Jaw.
1

I n fact,

Von Leyden's book contains, besides the Latin and English texts of the
essays on the law of nature, a number of Locke's other writings, unpublished
before now. and a lengthy introduction of some ninety pages or so in which von
Leyden comments on different points of hIstorical interest and analyzes the
arguments presented.
Included among these introductory pages are reasons suggested why the essays on natural Jaw remained unpublished.
Von Leyden lists
five such reasons: (I) the translation of the essays into English would prove
too laborious for locke; (2) many of his Ideas were placed in the Ellay instead; (3) he lacked conviction about the subject. particularly in light of his
later hedonistic morals; (4) his views on authority changed considerably; (5)
Locke may have felt that the essays lacked maturity of thought.
John Locke,
Essavs .sm the ~.2.f. Nature, ed. W. von Leyden (Oxford, 1954). p. 14. Tni s book
will hencefort~ referred to 85 the Ea!ays.
I

2

scholars used natural law as an initial premise in most of their discussions on
morality and civil Jaw.

The appearance of the essays in our day has aroused

little excitement because many ItmoderiY' theories proudly disdain the natural Jaw
doctrine. and even the growing number of proponents of natural law can find many
another more adequate exPOsition of their position.
Why bother, then, to expend ener9Y on these essays?
pte.

The reasons are multi

For one thing, the very way modern tbeorists slough off the topic demands

that a 1ess careless consideration be given to a doctrine that has had stuff
enough to stay standing for twenty centurIes or so.
a I aeun. in Locke' s other t«)rK.s.

Also, these essays fill in

They of fer some Jus t f fJ cat i on for hIs f requen

references to the natural Jaw as the basis for his political theories, and they
help bridge the gap between the dominant eq>irfcism In his epistemolOgical work
and the rationalism of his other writings.

FInally, the essays lend further

evidence of Locke's genius in doing one thing--asking provocative questions.
Locke asked questfons which philosophers from his tlme on have tried to
answer.

Sometimes his very way of stating problems only ereated greater diffi-

culties. but his thought never failed to stimulate.

so much so that his "phil_

osophy exercises undisputed sway over the Ideas of the entire eighteenth century.1I 2 He interrupted the flow of philosophy to ask one particularly pertinent
questIon:

IIJust how much do we really know?"

on Locke remarks:

D.J. O'Connor in his conmentary

!lBy thus raiSing the nature of knowing as a problem, Locke

was introducing a new point of view into European philosophy.

And this point

2, sai ah Berl in, Ihe Age .2f. Enll 9btepment (Boston, J 956), p. ,30.

3

of view, for good or iiI. has dominated philosophy since his time. 1f3
"Just how much do we really know?u He had a very practical reason for
asking the question.

Locke did not sport at dialectics.

,;lnd searched for its answer with another problem in mind.

He put the question
Unless he determined

how we know and how much we know. Locke cou Jd not t aekl e the d iff i cu It i as· wh i ch
his contemporaries posed to him about morality and the natural law.

I n fact,

his EJJsl £2ncernlns Human Underat,nding might never have taken shape except for
Locke'S pressing interest in how we come to know the rules of morality that
should govern us.
it

Von Leyden gives the fol Jowing, interes,ting account of how

was that a discussion on morality and the natural Jaw gave rise to the

~s!ax

Concrern i OS H2!J!1!P Under! tlnd i ns.
A gnoup of five or six of Locke'S friends were gathered for a discussion at
the London home of Anthony Ashley Cooper, sometIme In 1671.
Locke informs us that the topic discussed by the group at the outset
was "a subject very remotet l from the special Inquiries into the understand-

ing which arose out of the discussions at a Jater stage and of which the
Essay of 1690 was the final outcome. TyrelPs comment on this point is
more ext) t i c:1 t.
liThe discourse," he says. It began abou t the pri nc i pies of
mrs) ity and reveal'd rei igron. 1f Now that we have come to know more about
Locke's lIterary activities about 1671. Tyrel"s hint appears significant.
t presume that the discussion among Locke's friends was at first about the
Jaw of nature as the basis of morality and its relation to natural and revealed religion.
Locke's early thoughts on this topi~ served as a convenient starting point; and some other member of the group, possibly Lord
Ashley himself. may have eontrlbutea the sbort essay. originally among the
Shaftesbury Papers, beginning: liThe Light of Nature Is reason set up in
the soul at first by God in man's Creation. seeond by Christ. tI But then.
as Locke tells us, difficulties arose In the course of the discussion.
possibly concerning the question how the natural Jaw comes to be known.
3Daniei J. O·Connor, ~ L2Ske (London, 1952) p. 27

4

The question had played a prominent part in Locke's essays. but we can
understand if his solution of it left room for doubts and puzzles.
So it
was decided to start afresh and to approach the 5ubje<::t matter under discussion on a strictly epistemological basis, i.e. to inquire into the
origin and extent of human knowledge. The new course was taken up by
Locke himself. and after reading out at the next meeting Itsome hasty and
undigested thoughts" he pursued his inquiries during the su~r and autumn
of 1671 in two preliminary drafts of the Essay which we know.
This close casual connection between the writing of the Eas!y Concerning
Hum!n

U~r§tandins

important reason.

and the problem of natural Jaw has been pointed out for an
For the first part of this thesis will concern itse'f with

whether Locke's views on knowing the natural Jaws were consistent from these
earl y essays through his 1ater and more famous works.

He began his EssaX Con-

cerninQ !J!..!!t:aJ3 !In.'Maadlng to clarify points at issue regarding the origin of
knowledge. particularly in respect to rules of morality.
developed thought in the ESIIY and in the

lI2 TreaSiaes

confirm his initial doctrine or reject it?

~

Did his more fully
Civil government

Are his early essays consistent

w'th his later works or not?
Tbe second major InvestJgation of the thesis will consider

~lether

or not

Locke's proof for knowing the natural law can withstand the objections of its
critics.

Has the argument any validity?

Two problems then, will draw the focus of attention:

the consistency of

the !s!axs .2!l the..be.if "StuCe wIth Locke's later doctrine;

and the val idlty

of his argument for knowledge of the law of nature based on sense experience.
Any mention of the word "consistency' in reference to Locke immediately
rai ses problems.

"Orl gi nal lt • "sttmul ati ng", 'leI ear-thi nk' ngH and many another

5

word of praise has been predicated of Locke, but never "consistent. 1t

Critics,

students and historians are all quick to expose inconsistencies in Locke's
doctrine.

W. T. Jones, for example. notes that:

"Nothing is easier ••• than

to point out inconsistencies in Locke's theory. ••

If consistency were the

soJe element in the philosophical ideal. it would be hard to understand the

great inf1uence of Locke's views In so many different fields. ItS

Some, like

Bertrand Russell. find little reason to become concerned about this fact,6 but
none wIll attempt to defend Locke from all charges on this score.

What Ster-

ling Lamprecht remarked concerning Locke·s ethical theories would serve as good

advice in any treatment of Locke:

lilt

would be a mistake to attempt to fit all

he said into one harmonious whoJe. u7
Nevertheless, the

bo

been greatly exaggerated.

most faaous "incongruitieslJ in Locke's theory have
The first is the "apparently contradictory c1aims of

rational ism and ElqJiricisat t8 within his theory of knowing itself. between the
second and fourth books of the EIStX.

Professor Aaron, as we shall see, does

5W• T. Jones. A H"ioa .2.f. w.tun PhiJol9Phx (New York, 1952) p. 752.
6
'
In his Uil&RCX s! Western PhIJO~ (New York, 1952), p. 613, Bertrand
Russell states: "No one has yet succ~ in i ovent' ng a philosophy at once
credible and self.consistent. Locke aimed at credibility and aenieved It at
the expense of conststency. Most of the great philo&Ophies have done the opposite. The most fruitful philosophies have contaIned glaring inconsistencies.
but for that very reason have been partially true. There Is no reason to
suppose that a self-consistent system conte' ns me".e truth than one, which like
Locke •s is obv i ous 1y more or I ass wrong. It

7SterJlng Lamprecht,
York, 1918), p. 104.

the

Morll

.ID2 ~oll tical

Pbi12s22hx.2! JI.2!m bocke

~. T. Jones. Bistorx at Western PhJ19!OQbx (New York, 19S2). p. 752.

(New

6

much to explain away many of the apparent Incons'stencies tn this regard.

The

second "incongruity." which concerns us more directly, has been rather fully
enunciated by W. S. Carpenter in his Introduction to an edition of

l!2 Ir!!tises

on Civil Government:

It Is to the credit of Fitzjilll1e$ Stephen (in~iab"f!Sle. 11

(London. 1891). p. ISO) truat 1M should have ..en fnt'iii pol t cal theory
of Locke a striking incongruity with his metaphysics. The object of the
.I.u.Ir.!9SJCO' ~ .HYmIn ~Cf5~IDS is to destroy the doc:tri ne of Innate
ldiii a to re uceaflllOW age to a general ization of experience. The
~It~U Ji!!l -'1ill "t_oS appears to be the very reverse of thl s"
~fou~ entlr~n t e two conceptions of the state of nature and
the 1_ of reeson. and it Is diffieult to see how Locke could arrive at
either of these conceptions from experience. They are simply fIgments of
the lind an4 as much creatures of Locke's own fancy as Plato's B!eubJlc

was.

With the pubUc.tfon of the

Cum .sw.J.bal:a..o! DISMre

which deal preclsel

with the derivation of the Jaw of nature from expert enee, such a gross charge
of .. i nc:ongru i ty" aga' ns t Locke' S

WI" I t

i *'9' show I d neYer appear ag. in.

The

question "how Locke could arrive at either of these conceptions from experience
receives an answer from Locke hI_elf In the essays.

Dr .. von Leyden considers

this reconcU iatlon of Locke's doctrine one of the chIef values orlsi n9 from
the publication of these early essays:

lIlt Is now possible to recognize that

Lockefs ttc> main bo4les of doctrine, namely his political theory .nd his theory

of knowledge, hwe a c:onmon ground and that this lies in his early doctrine of
the natural law... IO
But the fact that Locke wrote

_UtIDS

Jedge of the I., of nature serves only as

'w.

S. Carpenter, eel. John I..ocke,
(London •• _ , . Introduction, xlv.

II

on the emplrfeal basis for knowbeginning of the investigation.

De IrMtll!§ s.n "vI! &mrnment •

lOw. von Leyden, ttJohn Locke and the Natural Law,"
1:17'11, .. ~.

'bflglQBby,

XX, (January

7
Granted that he indicated an element of empirical data in founding the natural
Jaw, many questions remain to be answered.

15 the theory of

~~wledge

expound-

ed in the early essays a temporary. trial hypothesis. or is it substantially the
same as the theory evolved by Loc;;ke in the Essay Concernins HW!:I" Under§tandins1
Does Locke have the same concept of natural law in these initial essays as appears in the ESalX and in the Ircatia's?
ays is based on the law of nature.

His ethical theory in the early ess-

Does it remain based on natural law in his

later works?
Not every eonc.ept or term used In the ESi!>'1

.2!!the Law.2f. Nature can be

scrutinized in the light of Jater writings, but at least some conclusion can be
reached in regards to Locke's besic oonsistency or inconsistency.
The problem of the validity of Locke's arguments should prove no Jess engaging.

Surprisingly little concern AU been shown for the argument w:>rked out

by Locke in the essays.

The essays, we are told. are important because they

"fill in some of the detailed thinking in the concept of a
the SeS11!.9 IeuSh!.2!! ;Ivil GiYe(f!!R!t. omitted',

JI

1~1

of nature which

and they show how the probJeII

of morality influenced the inception of Locke's other works.

But little or

nothing Is mentioned regarding'the contribution of the argument itself. 12

"Jobn W. Yolton, Review of the Essays:
(July 1955), 489.

Ib! Phlloao&t!ia!

In

Reyiew. LXVII

l1rh.following men who reviewed voa Leyden's edition of Locke's E'lft!.2!l
the J:.e .Qf U;UyrS or \tIho wrote COI1IDentar i as on the ed i t i on had J itt t e or noth ill!
to say about the positive contribution of Locke's argument, and none made any
attempt to defend it: O. J. Allan, Review of the ISIIYs. ~lRfORhX, XX (April
1956), 182-184; James Collins, '~he Year in Philosophy, 1 " Ihousht, XXX
(Spring 1955), at.-86; John W. Lenz, "b25ke • s .iluxJ. s.a.lb! ~!J.9.f. Nature,"
Philo!9.Pbx _
PilO9f!!!nol2Slc,1 ~r~, XVII-(September 1$ , 105-11); P. G.
Lucas, H'Uscussion: John Locke,W~
:Pemhlya! Qv'Ulr!rv. VI (April 1956),
174-176; John W. Yolton. Realew of the Essay!: the Ph!l0l22hiS,1 Review. LXVII
IJuJ v 19'i§)

I.OftI.ftA

8
fact t O. J. Allen comments that the publication of the essays has great value
daspi\i! "the second-rate quality of the essays themselves. lti )
Part of this unconcern for the subject matter of the essays, it is truo,
from a realization that Locke's arguments are far from flawless and that

~tems

nDre satisfactory expositions of natural law doctrine can be found.

AdniittodJy

then, to defend Locke's argument as wholly valid woul_ be a rash and unwIse move
But granting all this, a word should yet be said in defense of what Locke bas

written.

In the first place. Locke's political theory. based as it Is on this

law of nature, carries far too much weight historically to be 51 ighted in this
Our own Declaration of Inclependeneeand consti tutJonaJ form took root in

way.

a fundamentally Lockeian concept of natural taw.

Secondly. too many writers

noted thus far have been ail tOO quick to disregard entirely what Locke had to
say about the law of nature.

For some this disregard stem& from an Ingrained

contempt for the whole theel-Y of natural law.

clear tlten he coanents that:

Von leyden makes such an attituo

tithe ri se of modern juri sprudence is cbaracteri zed

by the abandonment of the theory of natural law.

Also most modern philosophers

analysts as well as positivists. have come to regqrJ the notion as obsoJetc. ul4

Led

by

this conviction, von Leyden then procee3~'S to make short shrift of

Locke's argument, burying it finaily in the graveyard where he feels atl such
arguments on natural law belong.

130• J. Allan. Review of the

J4w.

J956),

II,axl. PhIl210el!X$ XX (April 1956). J~.

von Leyden, 'IJohn Locke and the Natural Law,tt Phi losophx. XX (January

25.

Is tn both the article noted above and In the introductory pages of the
Essays (pp. 4)-60) von Leyden analyzes and criticizes Locke's argument.

9

But we shall see that Dr. von Leyden has put the wrong corpse to rest.
he argument that he has so neat Iy shre<fded does not exact 1y match what Locke

If then. as should be admitted,

~ke'$

argument is not wholly defensible,

least his thoughts on the subject deserve a much fairer treatment if only in
the interests of historical objectivity. Yet not a singJe writer consulted l6
kes any protest in favor of Locke and against Von Leyden's criticism.

Such a

tate of affafrs demands all the more imperatively that some defense of Locke's
rgument be made.

The

part of the thesl s will en deals wi til the valldi ty of

ocke's argument for knowledge of the natural law will not attempt to substantiate the who'e of Locke's argument, but it will endeavor to show that Locke's
rgument is basically sound and far different from the interpreted argument whl
on Leyden ascribes to Locke.
But before beginning either the investigation into the consistency or that
into the validity of Locke·s doctrine, It will be helpful to survey what Locke
included in his EI'IXI5m Jit J:..t.t! .2f.l!sure.

16See footnote 12 on page 7 of this thesis.

CHAPTER II
THE PROPOSITION:

THERE EXISTS A LAW OF NATURE

WI CN CAN BE KNOWN BY REASON

THROUGH SENSE EXPERIENCE

Loeke presented his proofs for knowing the natural Jaw in the form of eight
essays, which probably served at some time as notes for a series of lec:tures.
Fortunate)y, W. von Levden, "the leading authority on Locke·s manuscriPts,lt l
edited the essays in book form.

The book also presents some vaJuable prelimi-

nary discussions to which we will refer at length later in the thesis.
fitCh

of the eight essay5 answers. particular point on natural law.

J.

In the fi rst essav Locke asks, 1115 there a Jaw of nature?"

He answer

affirmatively, showing that design in the world gives proof of God's existence.
As governor of the world, God must ordain rules of oonduct which govern men.
These rul es are the Jaw of nature wi ch Locke delcr i be.s: "Hence, th is Iaw of
nature can be described as betng the decree of the divine will discernible by
the I i gAt of nature and i ndi cat f OS what is and what is not in conformi ty wi til

rational ..ture. and for this very reason commending or prohibiting.!

Locke

argues that man's special function Is to use his reason, the use of which will
Jead him to

84.

iii

knowledge of the. natural law.

The fact of human conscience also

'James Collins, "The Vear in Philosophy. 1954. 11 Ihgus!u. XXX (Spring 1955)"

10

)J

lends evidence to the existence of a natural law.

~

The central argument In this essay shows that since there is a governance
of the whole universe by laws, therefore man Is also bound in a way suitable to
his nature.

Furthermore, human society could never exist without natural law

as a basis for constitutions and contracts.
honor in virtue.
2.

Without it, too, there would be no

All men would act for the sake of utility.

"Can the I aw of nature be known by the tight of nature1 H

answers, yes.

Locke

By light of nature he means an inward process of reasoning

starting from sense experience.

He rules out knowing the natural Jaw by tra-

di t ion because tr'adi tiona di ffer, because thl5 is not a primary source of knowledge, and because tradition Implies trust. not knowledge.
scription (i.e •• innate ideas) also.
dJ:c.over for us the law of nature.

sense

e~rience

He rules out In-

But reason based on sense experience will
Reason leads us from idea$. taken from

to infer the existence of God;

and as soon as God Is proved.

the notion of a universal Jaw of nature binding on all men necessarily emerges.
Locke

particularly coneerns hilD$elf In this essay with establishing the

origin of ideas from sensation.

'~e

investigate here the first principles and

sources of all kinds of knowledge, the fllaY fn . . feb primary notions and the
elements of knowledge enter the mind. Hl

Reason plays an all-important role in

leading to a knowledge of the natural law. but it does nothing to establish the
e1ements of knowledge.
to it by the senses.

It can achieve nothi n9 unless something is fl rst given

12

"Is the natura} law inscribed1n4 No, Locke responds, and he offers a

3.

:;cries of reasons why.

The docirioo of innate ideas is a mere assertion and

las so far nevar been proved.

If there were such

~

natural imprint of the law

pi nature In r.en's hearts, it \\QuId be un; versaHy known and obeyed.
rot taken piaco.

Thi s has

If the law of nature were innate, primitive people should be

he best observers of it, and the fool ish and insane should also have a knowledgE
~f

it.

4.

in the rourth essay Locke places his most i1\llortam; questions and
lIean roason attain to the knowledge of natural law through sense ex-

fJnswors.

He answers, yes.

parience?"
ill.JSt

be ful fi I led:

'0 Wlom

For the natural law to be known. two conditions

man must be able to know that there exists a superior wi II

he is rightly subject. and that superior wi Ii must

... Ii i ngs to be
Locke

R;.lVe

disclosed certair

done by us respect i OS the COt'Irnands of his wi 1 J •

then explains how sensation and reason work together to gather this

Sensation furnishes reason with the ideas of particular objects and
~eason then combines these ideas or images to ferm now complex ideas. S Our

knowledge.

4

.

Locke appears to be arguing in this essay against a very naive concept of
nnate ideas in which the ideas are present and k~m to us at all time. clearly
lis COIllnents on innate tOOral propositions indicate that this is so: HUncharage~ble as they are and aJways clear, they are known to us without any study or
~e1i berate consi derat ion."
E§saXli' p. J 374 Then he goos on to prove that no
~uch imprint is had.
Locke seems to make the same faise supposition about the
~aturc of innate ideas in the first book of his Essgy Concernins Hyman Understandi nQ al so.
SLockc makes no attefi1)t to clarify in this essay \<'"hat he means exactly by
daas or Images. Throughout the essays we will find that his episteooJogy is
rather crude and rudimentary.

13

senses teU us of bodies and their properties, of MOtion and of regularity in
the uni verse.

Reason i nqui res into these sense data and i nfe·rs the existence

of God, particularly of God as a la\t61laker, a superior wi J 1 to whom we are suOject.

From tbis knowledge of God as a Jawnaker reason infers that, since tbe

\\OrJd manifests purpose, man has a duty to use his equipment, which's reason,
to discover his

s~ciaJ

be perforaed by man.

roJe in tbe world.

God intends certain activities to

From this man perceives his duties to \\Orship God, to

preserve himself, to Jive in society, and so forth.
S.

In his fifth essay, Locke denies that the law of nature can be proved

from general consent.

Whether the consent is positive, arising from a contract

or natura), spri ngi ng from a cartal n natural i nsti net, it wi II ROt prove the
law of nature.

Certain Jaws derived fl"'Ofll positive consent have no meaning in

the context of natural law.

for

~le.

the positive agreoo.ent that safe

pa.sage will be given to all envoys bas no particular foundation in the natural

Jaw.

The natural law forbi ds altogether the i nj ury of any person and suggests

no additional reaSOll why this should be more true for an envoy than for anyone

else.
A consensus of practh;e offers even I ass reason for provi"9 the 1aw of

nature.

uFor if what is rightful anr.l lawful were to be determined by men's

way of living. noral rectitude and integrity
. ians and Spartans approved of stealing.

customs totally indecent and unchaste.
cide.

A Brazi 1ian tribe

...

acknowl'~Bed

~utd

be d('ne fO,..'1

6

The Egypt-

The Assyrians ood Ethiopians

practi~

Certain Indian natives Justified suino God at all •
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On the other hand. even If there were general consent regarding some opinlot.
this consent WGuld not be sufficient to prove that the opinion fell under the
natural J m'4.

6.

HAre It3n bound by the 1aw of nature?"

the Jurists' definition of obligation;

bound to render tlhat is due. lIl
poses

CIt

Obi

Ves, says Loeke.

He borrows

"it is the bond of law whereby one Is

igatlon Is had Whenever a rightful power im-

COtlIDand upon us, making his wi II known to us.

The perception of this

obI i gati on may arhe either frOO'l fear of punishment, or better from a "rational
apprehension of . .at Is rI9ht/'S

The natura) Jaw binds because it contains all

the necessary condItions noted above.

A rightful power is had by God as the

creator of all thtngs, and His will is known to us in the natural law, in the
~~y

described in the fourth essay.

7.

Ills the bindIng force of the natural law perpetual and universa)?11

After answerIng a doubt about the existence and bindil19 force of the

lYes.

natura) 1aw, Locke proceeds to expJ at n in what sense the
ing the different types of obligatorv acts involved.

'aw is perpetual.

Aetua1ly. he gives no

proof for the perpetua t character of the natura J Jaw, but on I y remarks that
is coeval with the human race.

versa I because it is

~ted

not-

't

The binding force of the natural law Is uni-

in human nature, which is everywhere the same and

wi 11 not enange.

8.
it is.

His :nan's own interest
He

too

basis of natural Jaw?n

Locke denies that

first explains his terms by defining 1IIilat he means by "basis of the

7H~id ••

p. lSI.

~Ibid.,

p.

U35.
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natural law' and by "each mants fnterest.,,9
precisely:

Then he states the question IOOre

"Hence the point of the question is precisely thfs:

Is it true that

·;lIat each individual in the circumstances Judges to be of advantage to himself

and his affairs is in accordance with natural Jaw, and on that account is not
only la\'lfuJ for him but also unavoidable, and that nothing hl nature is binding
except so far as it carries with it some itmlediate personal advantages. IIIO

locke denies this for three reasons: Private interest cannot be the basis

or

the Jaw of natl,.lre because (1) dut i ful act f ons do nqt at'i se out of .re ut i Ii ty,

and virtue often consists in doing sood to our own toss;
est were the basis of the law, it
interests. and

U)

~)d

be impossible

(2) if private inter-

to avoid conflict of

all justice, friendship and gener05ity would be abolished.

Hence. locke concludes. personal advantage is a consequence of obedience to the

natural law rather than the basis of it.
Von Leyden, in his intl'odU(;torv notes. synthesizes th¢ tnought of these
essays and Locke's process of argumentation according to four main aspects:
He passes from the re.~nition that man is rational to the assumption
that man's reason. on the basis of sense experience, leads to the discover'
of moral truths, then If property employed, to the discovery of one and
the same set of moral truths. i.e. natural law.
From this he passes to
the be J i ef that the truths thus discovered are d f vine coum.;mds bind i n9 on
all men, and hence to the assertion that the validity of such ~mnands can
be proved, and even shown to be necestary in the S~i \~y as a geometrical

demonstration. I I

Von Leyden considers Locke's argument to be fallacious, involving un-

'E§iiYS,PP. 205-207.
! 0.!Jl.!.i., p.

207.

U'bist., p. 59.
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~nrranted

1eaps between d i ffer-ent

p. anes of knowl ed:)e.

path he believes Locke to follow is this:

ooral truths;

tberefore, they are valid and necessary_

This interpretation misses,
~n

his reasoa leads to

man is rational;

these ooral truths are the same for al J men and are obi iging on

as divine coanands;

~li

In a briefer fonm, the

it

seems, the crux of

Locke's

evaluation of his interpretation will be the conoern of Chapter IV.

~ar$

What

to be oore important for Loc.ke than the fact of man's rationality is the

pvera) l des i gn man ites tIn the \l«)rI d.
~upreme intel' ig.nee (God).

faust have had
~od

But

argument.

SOlie

Th is des i gn reveal s the governance of a

Kan, too must be governed by this God, since God

purpose in creating him.

And only vmen this governance by

is recognized, only then can we say that man's reason, on the basis of sense

pxperience, Jeads to the disoovery of moral truths.
~an4ar

about and happen upon the natural Jaw..

Han's reason does not Just

I t sets out to find someth log

it knows exi sts.

Lockets basic argument, then, \«)Old seem to be rather aloog these li005;12
It is quite obvious from the design in the world that

&Orne

almighty lawgiver and

governor (God) exists.

It is unreasonable to suspect that man is not included

in the averan design.

Hence, there must be a law particularly directed to man

Find his conduct.

it

law that befits man's nature.

But how can man know God.s law or design In his regard?
by

using what is his natural equipment. his reason.

If

The answer is:

no uses his reason

l2rhis disagreement with von Leyden in the interpretation of Lockets srgu..
will be taken up and discussed in detail in Chapter IV of the thesis.
The
SUil'f'ilaries given here are hltended merely to point out the central problem and
the line of thought in the essays. fuller documentation will also be given.
~nt
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properly, he can discover God's law In his regard.

Locke answers that this Is done by a combination of sense

reason properly?

experience and reason.
existenee.

But how does one use hiS

fIrst, from the design in the world we infer God's

As our creator, He has a rightful power over us.

ator, God has

is

fixed purpose for us.

As

8

wise cre-

Hence, He has sOOlething in mind for us

Once we know that He has some purpose for us, we search for what the

to do.

lIsomethlng" may be.

The "something" God Intends for us to do can be Inferred,

however, from His ultimate purpose (His Glory) and from our own enc:.l<Mnents, particularly from reason.

And from this we conclude to our duties to God, 'self,

and others.
Obligation to a law arises when there Is a superior will over us which will

Is somehow disclosed to 1.15. 13
so that

.t

clearly obliges man.

But the natural law contains these two requisite
The supreme will over us is God;

Hia will is

disclosed to us Indirectly as we discover little someth'ngll which he Intends for
us to do.
This, In short, is what Locke has to say in the early essays about the law
of nature.

The eShYs uncover for us Locke IS thoughts on the theory of cog-

nition, the notion of God, the concept of natural law, and other subjects which

bear upon his later writings.

Included too, Is a rather emphatic, statement and

proof of the existence, f<.nt'JlW8bi I Ity and binding force of the law of nature.

Ilrhls particular notion of obligation and many other exprGssions used by
Locke are distinctly voluntaristic.

CHAPTER II.
ARE LOCKE'S STATEMENTS ON KNOWLEDGE OF THE NATURAL LAW
COnSISTENT WITH HIS LATER WORkS?

To evaluate the eonsistency of the IiSHxt !m.

later work., two comparison. mu.t be
~logy.
~arly

made.

!h! ~ 21

Nature with Locke's

One comparison concerns episte-

It wtll relate Locke's statements on knowing the natural law in the

essays to his genera! theory of cognition as found In the EssaX £oncerning

ttuman Y!!.<l!rstandigg_

The second comparison involves the notion of natural law •

...oc:ke·s concept of the 1.'1 of nature as presented in the early essays must be

e.Kam.ned in relation to the references I'I.'tade to natural law In the Essay ,tonce!:!!-

!!J.9

Human !l!!5!!.t~landin9 and In the Second Tr!M!ti!e..2.'l Clvil GovermentO'

The first comparison on epistemology is the more difficult.

CrItics of

,.oc:ke have not been slow to point out numerous Inconsistencies within Locke's
fInished Essax of 1690.

Yet that Essay has the advantage of nearly thi fty years

for developnent and refinement af thought over the EssaXI 2!l

!!2! !:!! g.f. !fature.

~ full and carefully del ineated theory of ~Iedge. then, can hardly be expectec:l

~roro the early essays.

Hence, the com~rison of the ways of knotrlledge in these

two works will necessarily be restricted to main outlines with little attempt at
:leta I led analysis..

The comparison should be suffltient, however, to indicate

",hether the early essays contained the seeds of his later thought or whether

the~

give Initial. trial Ideas later to be rejected.
The E.saX

~9.~rntn.s

,Human

Understandi~.sh

18

besides being Locke's most famous

19
~rk.

contains practically all of Locke's epistemology.

We mIght begIn our

1cO'11II".-l8r.sons, then. by studying whether Locke's remarks on hl.lD!m understanding In

the early essays fIt Into his later doctrine in this gsslY_
In the early essays he informs us that there are only three ways In wllich
~

could come to the knowledge of anything:

'Whatever we know Is eIther in-

scribed, from tradition, or drawn from the senses. 1t

I

He rules out inscription

(I.e., Innate Ideas) and tradlt Ion. and settles upon knowledge drawn from the
senses.

This Is man's natural way of knowing, or as Locke phrases it, Itknawing

by the light of nature alone.·,2

By saying that something can be known by the

1 ight of nature Itwe mean nothing else but thet there is some sort of truth to
the knowledge of which. man can attain by himself and without the help of an-

other, If he makes proper use of the faculties he Is endowed with by nature. li )
What are these facultlel?4

They are Simply reasoning and sense expertence.

Locke explains at length the role of each of these faculties and how the twe
work together.

knowledge.IIS

Sense

_perlenee gives us ilpr'mary notlonl and elements of

It furnishes reason with "Ideas of partIcular sense objects. u6

',slays, p. 125.
2

Ibid •• p. 133.

3'bld •• p. 123.

4ay faculties, Locke simply means different functions or powers of the mind
The word is not intended in the technical, scholastic sense.
SESSayS, p. 125.
6
'bid. t p. 147.

20

Its function Is to supp1y reason with matertal for Its work.

Sense experIence

alone wi J I not suffice, "for wIthout reason, though actuated by our senses, we
can seereefy rIse to the standard of nature found In brute beasts, seeing that
the pig and ape, and many other quadrupeds, fer surpass man In the she.-,ness of
the senses. tl7

Sense experience and reason mast serve c.ach other. "scO$Ctlon

furnIshing reason with the Ideas of particular sense objects and supplying the
subJec:t metter of discourse, reason on the other hand guiding the faculty of
$ense, and erranging the Images of things derived from sense percept ion, thence.
formIng and composing new one5. 118

ReHon, we find. guides .the sense faculty, arranges Images and composes
from them.

~

But It allO usearches .net discovers JfIWS,H9 end by It "one may find

way from perceptIble and obvious things Into their hidden nature. IIIO

tn

l'Xk.els fullest descrlpUon of reeson It fs "the dlsc!lrslve faculty of the mind,

which advances from things

~

to things unknaMt .. and argues from

OM

thing to

another In a definIte and fixed or.r of propositions. ull
Hence, ruson arranges • .,.ides,
concludes...... vast number of tasks.

for its mater.al.

S'bld.
9'bld •• p. 111.
HJ'bld.

-

argues, searches, Infers and

Nevertheless, it depends anti rely

"Admittedly, reason makes use of these elements of

71\!d.

11

c:ompo$e5 t

Ibid., p. 149.

Oft

sense

21

:<.oowledge, • • • but It does not. in the least establ ish them. lIJ2
either sense or reason and the other is of no aveil.
together, lithere is nothing so obscure. so

eon~led,

But with the

Take away
t\'IO

working

so removed froen any

~n"

Ing that the mind. capabie of everything. could not apprehend it by reflection
I '~
and reasoning. If it is supported by these faculties." ..
Locke then describes the actual process by whieh the natural law is knatm.

First, sense teaches us the real existence of $olld bodies and especially that
t4
"this world is constructed with wonderful art and regularity.U
Then the mind
Hafter more carefully considering In Itself the fabric of this world, • • •
thenee proceeds to an inquiry into the origin. to find what was the cause, and
Jli
who the maker of such a work.!1 -

From this inquiry,reason concludes to a wise

creator whose wi II governs us and has power over us.

In demonstrating that this. wise creator and superior wi II (God) has laid
down certain things to be done by us, locke Is not $0 expliCit in Indicating

just what sense and reason each contribute to the argument.

Sense plays a

SiMller part here. perhaps observing mants rational acts as distinguished from
a4:ts of l<::.IWer antmals. 16

But reason carries the load by thowing that God has

a purpose in creating us and that this purpose involves us in using our par'"

12 Ibid •• p. 125.
13'bld •• p. 147.
14
Ibid .. , p. lSI.

IS Ibid •• p. 153.
16Loc.ke frequently uses sense In as wide D meaning and scope as this.
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ticular

e~nents

for acting rationally, and that by so acting we will be led

t.o the observance of definite moral rules befittIng our nature.

The fact of the Interrelationship of sense and reason has certainly not
been neglected.

But Locke offers little detailed e.x.pJanatlon about the knoIWlns

process, so that great gaps lie open in his theory and many questions remain
unanswered.
To fi 11 In all the details, If such a thing were even poSSible, would
involve over-lengthy and unnecessary speculation.

Jne obvious lacuna, hOJlevcr.

should at least receive some comment if Locke·s theory Is to hang together at
aH..

According to Locke, we have the senses at workp then reason takes over.

But do the senses present kna.'ln Ideas?

sations?

Or does reason work wi til pure sen-

Or Is there some other faculty at work converting sensations Into

known Ideas with which reason can work?

Even in the crudest descriptions of

knowing. we do not think of sense data as fuJ l-bh'Mn ideas or knoIln truths.

And yet Locke tells us quIte elearly that lithe mind c:&MOt discourse or reason

without some truth that Is given or perceived. Ill]
The solution seems to be that Lcx:ke has some other power in the bacf< of
his mind as being at work here. sanething quIte close to the llperceptlonli whicl"!
he describes In the EINX Concerning H'-IQBn Understanding. II, 9.

his ideas on cognition would appear IncredIbly naive.
that the fact that Uthls visible world

'1 constructed

regularity ••• we INrn from the senses."

18

Otherwtse s

He notes, for Instance,

with wonderful art end

Vet notions of regularity,

23
structuro and order could hardly be classified as sensations.
Locke gives sone indication at least that he did have a power such as perception in mind.

for instance. In his Initial discussion of the light of

nature. Locke mentions that man is endowed with three IXX'lers. ''wIth understandi 09. reason and sense percept ion. 1119

We might safely presume, then, that the idea which reason handles. the

"truth that is gIven

!!!'! e!rcetr~,1120

Is • product of the combined efforts of

sense and percept ion.
But even with this ackUUon, Locke has offered only the simplest descriptio
of cognition, explained entirely In terms of the senses end of reason. with
perception perhaps understood.

Little or nothing is said about first prlncipl.

such u those of causality or fina'lty_
!..aYe
~

Much Is taken for granted.

But we

seen what constitutes Locke·s bas'e theory of eognition In the Essaxs 2!l

Y! .2!

Nature.

Same eIght or ten years passed between the wrltlft9$ of these essays end the

historic diSCUSSion of 1671 whieh led to Locke's first IItlasty and undigested
thoughts" on cognition end finally to the thoroughly worked out

Human Understanding In 1690.

~ssax ~rning

The thl rty Intervening years brought Locke many

deeper Insights and a c:ritlcal awareness of the difficulties In explaining the
<"...Q'llPlIcated process of hf.l'lMtft cognition.

Vet even thirty years did not suffice.

Locke' s II n I shed EsseX It 111 needed a greet dea} of ref I nement and reargon I-

19l~ld., p. 123.
20

Ibid., p. 149.

Italics not In the original.

24

utian.

21

It does, however, present a fuller and more meaningful account of

cognition than the early essays.

Locke'. famous l'faX

The followl""

'oncernias Human

In capsule form, is what

Understanding tells us about human

knowleage.
We begin wIth. ,.sslw. blank mind, a YRYla E4!!.

of our knowing the mInd Is receptive.
sensation or from reflec;tiora. 22

three types:

It takes In pri.ry Ideas eIther from

The prl.ry icleea from senHtlon enter as

(I) We get Idees about the sollellty, the motion or the impene-

trability of things.
selves.

In the Inltl.l stage

These properties actually belong to the things them-

(2) We receive Ideas about color, heat. taGte, end so forth.

These

do not actually belong to the things we see and taste, but sane property of the
thing, such as motion, acts upon our minds In such a way that we have a sensation of color or taste and we attribute It to the thlnt Itself.

receive knew1edge about the way in which thiags act upon us.

(3) We

8150

for exemple, we

knclw that the sun causes US to &:Ie warna and that a wind has the power to blow OUI

211vea such a favorable critic as Richard Aaron had to conclude "that
Locke's theory of knowledge is .defectlve In being both Incomplete and incoherent." Richard I. Aaron, John Locke, 2nd eel. (OXford, 1955), p. 247.

ala·....t

us then suppose the mind to be, as . . say, White paper, void of all
wIthout any ideas; how comes It to be furnished? ••• To this I
answer, in one .rd, from ex.perlenc:e: In that all our knowledge is founded.
and from that ultimately cIerh•• Itself.
Our observation, empJoyed either
about external sensible obJecU, or about the Internal operation. of our minds,
••• Is that which supplies our understanding with all the material. of thinkIng.
These two are the fountains of knowledge, from whence all the Ideas we
have, or can naturally have do sprlng.1t John Locke, An aIry ,oncernint HtJl18n
Under~ln,. eel. Alexander C. Fraser (OXford, 1904) . . . , • 2.
Hence orth
this
k wI 1 be referred to as !!! Essax. References are given ac:eordlng to
book, chapter and paragraph In this book.
ehar~ters.

25
hat off. 23

All theM are --.1es of prt_tv Ideas comlas from sensation.

But -

also pick up Ideas from experiencing the feet of thinking, of des I rfng, and
forth.

These corne to us as we reflect on what we are doing_

mal
$0

All of the.e

cane to the mind In the first stage of receptive knowledge.

''Receptive'', however. is not meant to Imply total Inactivity on the part oi
The mind must take notice of the

the mind.

have ideas.

senH

data before we can be $a.d tc

This takin, notice of sense data Locke calls perception..

It

would seem definitely to be an intel1ectua' activity since he says tbat it is
llby

S(Q8

calJed 'thinking' In general,,,24 and he regards the idea produced as

"present in the understand'ng.I.!S
-,

-~'

So whaoover we have sl..". Ideas. we know that the mind has been active in

perception.

Se..... MtNrience tell8lns.

~

the less, predominantly passive.

ufor in beret naked perception. the Blind is for the most part, only pas,lve. ancl
'What It perceive, it cannot avoid percelvlng_H

"'.'nt.

26

It is Intere'tlng to note, it

thet It wes Just such an operation as perception that we found unac-

eounted for in Loc:ke's early theory in the

be¥! 2!l She Law of Mgture.

$0 the mind Is not Inoperative In perceptioa. but it I ies almost dormant

until the second stage of the proeoss.

9.. B.

TheA the mind moves fnto

2lrhis dlvlsia of primary Ideas is treated by Locke In
24'bI4., II, 9, l25 1blel • , tI. 9. 2.

26 Ibid., II, 9, 1.

a~tIOR.

An EssaX,

w.

II. G,

bogln actively using our faculties.

The mind works with simple, primary Ideas

that it has received, to form CQ1'lPlex ideas. 27
"-.

I r:

~,.,

.

It fonns them in
.'.

~hree

ways:
'~-',

The acts of the mind I.\Ihereln It exerts its power over Its simple Id005
are chiefly these three: (I) Canbining several simple ideas into COI11pOUnd
ones; and thus all complex ideas are made. (2) The second is bringing two
ideas, whether simple or canplex. together, and setting them by one another
so as to take a view of them at once, without unating them Into 000; by
which it gets all its ideas of relations. (3) The third is separating them
frail all other idGas that aecompany them In thel r real existence; and this
Is caned ilabstractionH and thus all its general ideas are made. 23
By
;~Jex

c~npoundin9,

by

relating, and by abstracting, then,

~

obtain all our

ideas just as all our primary ideas cane fron sensation and reflection.

Those simple and co:nple:x ideas described above are the w::>rking elcmants o'f

~hi s

f fl tile fourth book of the C.SS8Y.

He

defines vna:dedge as the ilparcept ion

'f the connection and agreement, or disagree1letlt and repugnancy, of any of our

'.....w.-_ 1,29

; ,ti"Ulo4':
?I .....

Agreement or dis8greo.'iM.'mt of ideas rests

r.>tand a i ittle lOOre distInctly, "'/!lerein this

(.)41

a four-fold basi s.

agre~ment

"To under-

or disagree.11ent eonsist$.

27. t Should be noted that Locke uses the word ;'idoo" in a rather swoepin9t
sa )-embracing fashion. "Idea" is the term wnh:oh he feels "serves best to stand
~!:.:;·r wi1atsoever is the object of the un<ierst&ndiD'J when G man thinks.
I bave
lsed it to express whatever is meant by phantasm, notion or species, or whatever
it Is ~1hic.h the mind can be Employed about in thinking; and I could not avoid
~requently using 1t.1i
!.'l ~!say. " I. 8.

aa JItL<!.,

It, 12, 1.

291P..~ •• tV, It t. This definition ~nits Locke to a theory of representltionalis."l\J e three .. layer world of mind, idea sod tlbjeet.
"The mind in all it~
I:hOUgtlts • • • hath w> other frmedlate object but its ~n ideas • • • it is only
r':ryn\1et"sant about then. ii jJl.t~.

27

I think we may reduce it all to these four sorts:

(1) Identity, or diversity"

(2) Relation. (3) Co-exlstence. or necessary OOMeCtlon, (4) Real existence. u30

The categories which nnst c:onc;ern this thesis are relation and real ex'"
istence.

For relations under. Ie moral ity as well as mathematics, Which Locke

most frequently uses for examples.

In the §ssey, gn the

~

2!

N8tu!.~)

al ..

though he makes no direct reference to the concept of relation, Locke parallels

the derivation of a truth from moral laws to the derivation of a mathematical
t!~1ih.

"In fact It seems to me to follow just as necessarily from the nat.ure

of utan that, if he is a man, he is bound to 'ove and worship God, ••• as it

foll('Al$ fran the nature of s trBangle that, if it is

is

triangle, its three

angles are equal to two right angles. 1I31

In respect to the agreement of ideas baM on rea. exi stenee. Locke
himself strongly.

liAs to the fourth sort of our knatlledge, viz. II of the real

actual existence of things,
Ij

COI'IIili ts

\\Ie

have an intuitive knowledge of our own existence;

demonstrative knowledge of the existence of God;

of the existence of anything

else. we have no other but a sensItive kfQfledge. Which extends not beyond the
objects present to

our senses .,,32

Our knowledge of self Is Simply a direct: perception of our own action, in
this case without the Intervention of any hfee. 33

Lockets argument for tht~

30 lbld., IV. I, 3.
31

IssaD. p. 199.

32&1 i!.sa..,x. I v. 3. 2.1.
33Accordlng to Locke's C»In criterion, kf'KJllfiedge of self would not be true
If there is no idea of self there can be no perception of
agreernent •
knotl ledge , because

28
p;xistenc:e of God varies fran his approoch to that subject in the [S§ilYS-2!l
~l

2f.

Nature.

~tr&tion

In these early essays the proof was, for the most part, a demon-

frQll design in the world.

Here Locke is arguing from the contingency

pi his own existence to the necessary existence of God. 34
~nd

Our knowledge of sel

God. resting as it does on Intuition and demonstration. is certain.

When
~'There

'JC comes to knowledge of other real beings. Locke is not quite so sure;
Sf

indeed. another perception of the tnlnd employed about the particular ex"

stenc:e of finite beings \"Jtthlllut us;

Vet

!h!.

whfch, golng oeyond bare proUablUty, and

not reac;hing perfectly to either of the foregoing degrees of certainty,

~sses

under the oorlle kn<Mlodge.1I35

We find now

~imply

ti~t

those ideas whose agree.1lent

presents a prag-aatic oorm

rei·

-hings and Ideas of imaginary beings.

~Hferenc:e between t.he two;

C"'·

disagroe-nent we SOi.tght to

distinguishing between ideas of wcist.ing
The norm is our consciousness ai'

the differeru;e we perceive between seeing

tIle

too sun

~iJrin9 the day and thinking of it in the night. and also the differences in the
~onsequences.

the di fference between dreaning c·f a fi re and actually ooi09

!lurned by it.
This covers, for the

{ilOSt

part, the que.stion of

!!:!!! we

know. the iJbjective

tHtrt of our definhion of knowledge concel'ning the egreement or
~tween

our Ideas.

dlse9ree.~nt

OUf kneMledge is based on identity, reiatl;:m. co-existence

!!nd real existen<:e, wIth the lest mentioned 'neluding knowledge of

34l!!! ESH¥.. 1\1. lOt t-{;.

3Slbi~ ••

I\i. 2.,14.

seH~

God.

29
and other things.
But the oonpJete definition 'nc:.luded
3greenent or disagreemant of ideas.

.!!!1 \'Ie

knclrJ;

the perception of this

locke handles the problem of hat4 \'16 sttal

to eertain knowledge in a section on the degrees ot; knowledge, Book IV, Chapter

2.

t~t

every instance t1here the mind Is

~nployed

in perceiving identity,

relations, co-e.xistence or reel existence, is a case of perfect knowledge.
Whether knowledge is true or not depends on hott the perception is made, or what

kind of perception Is had.

If. for Instance, a relation Is only presumed and

judged to be there, only probabll Ity results.

But if the perception is an

unnistakable insight, then true KflO.'Iledge is had and such a perception is Gall
an Ilintuitlon."

Locke describes this intuition rather fully in Book IV~ 2. i

of the Essay.
Intuition is the basis of all true knowledge.

Only knowledge of exlstenc

in sensation escapes Intuition, and eYen this is a kind of intuition on a sense
level.

All other knowledge can be traced ultimately to one or more intuitions

There if:; another way, however, of achieving knowledge.
ition but It also goes beyond it.

It involves intu-

This Loc:ke cal is ciemonstratlon.

r.temOry does not fal I, certainty can be had through danonstratioo.

Where the

Certain

rnathoolatlcal propositions and propositions concerning lil.."1rality. for instance,
are known to be true;

yet thei r truth is not intnediately perceived Just fron)

an analysis of the statement.

Take for example the theorem .that en exterior

angle of e triangle equals the sum of the two remote interior angles.

statenent Is certain but Is not Intuited.
f~n ~ne

This

It is derived ultImately. however.

intuited facts.

Intuition. demonstration end sensation constitute an answer to

~

the

30

By

~,

duction:
ledge.n36

loe'«! has cover-ad rat'.cr wei i tht': matter suggested in his Intro·

lito inquire Into the origin, certainty, and extent of human knowThe odgin he has stated quite clearly:

al i knCMiedge is ba$4i.!ld on

what is, received either by reflection or through the senses.
The certainty of oor l<.nowledge he has dellooated but has been very reLiy Identity

strlctive In doing so.

relation we have

s~t

matics and In morality.

we gain certain trifling truths.

more Instructive
By co-existence

Ki~lcdge',

\'lie

Ily

particularly In 11lathe-

attain very little certitudo.

Concerning real exlst.ence we have certain K,oowic>clgc only of ourself and
and kna.-iledge not qui

to so CGrta'n of other things which are present

Goo',

to the

senses.
The extent of our krn<Jledge locke has not quite been able to determine.

Certainly It extends no further than our ideas$ and Is in fact MrrQNfer than
the scope of theca.

we

eamot know any material thing

have no /<nowledge of the: real essences of thinss;.:n
k.nowledge does extend at

an gSAX.

36

1~lt.

~npl&tely.

so that we

On the other hand, our

to k.nowledge of ourselves. God, mathematical

I. 1,2..

37Lockefs doctrine that we have no 1<11atI1edge of the real essences of
things, which Is dealt wIth particularly In Book III of the EIsel liOn Woreb ll ,
relses an Important problem In respect to this thesis.
For man 5 eSSGne6 or
nature must be kna.-m in order to know' the Jaw of nature.
But in his ti.SS8n on
the Law of Nature locfre ~re discusses whether we know the rGa 1 essence of
man,So tilai this problem belongs rather to the discussion on the validity of
his proofs. and need not concern us at present.

31
truth s and rules of mora llty.S a
But one final problem Is bothe ring Lock£l.

Is all this knCMledge real?

if it does not tell us about the world we live in. of what use
Is it to f~ our
ideas?
Locke realiz es that his defin ition of kncMiedge as the perce
ption of
agreement betwe en idees has cut him off fran the world .
And even hh remarks
lC04x.ernlng the knowledge of the real existe nce of thing s perta
ins only to ex""
istenc e and not to a kncMledge of what they are.
Locke began by insis ting stron gly that Dil kOOl\fledge must
deriv e ulti!1 lately
~rom the senses.
His empi ricJsm was the ru. ing note.
Then he
sudde nly found

himse lf In Book tV living in the realm of 'dees . a ration e1fst
build ing Ideas
iJpon Ideas .
N<J..I he reel i:e:es that he must reass ert empir icism again
and conne ct
deas to reali ty.
His very proce dure under lies r.1UCI1 of the confu sion that has
~thered about the "crit ical proble m. tI
He place d himse lf In an impos sible
!:>Osition. and the H~s. Berke leys and Kants to fol Jow made
certa in that the
UJeama was not overl ooked .
It Is to locke ls credi t. however, that he recog l'Zed the diffi culty and triod to eradi cate It.
Aaron argue s, too, that
loc!<e

lias not quite so incon sisten t as he Is claim ed to be by
tho$e who see a conpl ete

38Ac tually , Locke nowhere reaUy prove s that mora lity is
tratio n. AU that he says Is that the idea of ourse lves as capab le of demonsubje ct to God
~uJd "lf duly consi dered and pursue:d, affor d
such found ations of our duty and
i"ules of actio n as might plaee mora lity attPIl9 the scIen ces
capab le of deroon~tratlon." An
tV. 3, 18.
He gives one (I»~Je on prope rty to illus trate
~ such a sCTence might unf::)Jd.
But nothi ng more Is giwn .

Isex.
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reversal of field frcxn the second to the fourth book of the E$say. 3'";.
Our kn~11odge is not just b.:lre vision.
Clgree wIth things.

It can be and is real where ideas

Locke Is stHI trapped In representationalism:

lilt is

evhk.":f1t the mind knows not things il11"llediately but only by the Intervention of
the ideas It has of them"ll40

But

k~'edge

can be rool when IIthere is a con"

form tty bet\..een our I deas end the rca Ii ty of ttl i ngz .. }!1

Locf-'.e attempts to explain by examples how such a conformity betwoen Ideas

and reality can be had.

Simple Ideas agree with thtngs because the mind can-

not matte them of Itself;

so the things rJfI.Jst be prooucing these perceptions In

us.

With compler. Ideas. excepr. of substance. there Is no problem, because tIle)

arc of the mind's

a,1n

makIng and not Intended to be referred to the existence 01

39 ln hfs conmentary on Locke .. Richard Aaron has defended Locke from rash
char90s of tneol't!ltstency.
In fhc>~r. I', whore rr.any heV€' Int~rpf'Cted Locke's
e:np'riclsm as almost pure $ensatIOMlIs:n. Aaron argues that ufron the cont~'(t it
is quite claar that he has something I ike the intuition of Book I'J in mlnd.1!
Richard I. Aaron, ~ohn Locke, 2nd eel. (Oxford, 1955) t , . 34. Again when he
treats of Intuition in Book IV and the apparent abandomllilutt of empiricIsm. Aaror
defends him:
Is Locke Inconsistent?
ties he thrOJm his empiricism overboard and bec:.alle
a CartesIan ratIonalist?
• do not think so.
For whIle Locke's teaching
is idc,(";tical with Descartes' as to the subjective side of tho experience,
It is not so with regard to the object. ve ••• For Descartes the object oiintuition is a pure non-sensuous object; for Locke is a relation between
certain SIY!nt of sensation or reflection, or between complex Ideas dar-fwd

from this g!ven.

Aaron, p. 222.

(ttaltes in the original).

Athlttlng that Locke handled poorly the section which attempts to show the
reality of knowledge. Aaron concludes that Locke's final answer Is found in lV,
9~ 3-4 wIth the real knowledge of $elf, God, and ot~r things at least by sen...
s.9tlon.
4;)

an §ssax,

41 Lbld.

IV. 4. 3.
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Substances. Loc:ke aelm its. fa i I to be exact I y conformed to the rca II

anyth I ng.

ty outside us.

The difficulties with
least

~.Je

can say that

th(,);~c

loe~ sa;

orguments are too
the problem;

rtUiaerOU$

to mention.

At

and "\litl1 an interpretation such a

that made by Professor Aaron. much of Loekels doctrine C.cUI be salvaged and made

to appear less openly inconsistent.
We have, then, at least

Q

fal rly clear and c:ompNhensive view of locke's

general theory of hUIMn c:ognition.

His knc:Ml41edge originates with sense

oxperienc.e, with the mind bui Iding from primary ideas or notions by COfopounding
and comparing. to <:.OIJ,.,lox ideas" then ordering these by reason and demonstrati

to further heights if knowledge.

And this, in CS5eI1(;e, is the sane descriptio

more fully developed, that. he gave In the

I!YYS .2D. W.

~

2f. l1!tur,.

Just

how much the theories of cognition presented in these t\'tI.) \«)rks resemble each

other we can

n<7d

investigate.

Gut two rather important probl_s must be

answe.red before a legitimate conduslon can be reached.
First, In lootdng ().af:k over the two works that we have been comparing, a
fairly obvious difficulty appears regarding the use of the term "reason."
the early essays reason performs nearly every function of the mind.

later I'HX reason is rarely mentioned.

But, as

\fie

In

in the

shall see, the difficulty

resolves Itself Into .. difference of terminology rather than of doctrine.
Locke uses reason in a far more generiC way in the

does In the gssex Concerning

05~.ays

on natural law than he

!!.~n q~rstancUgg.

In the early essays, cognition was explained in terms of Just two faculties
sense and reason, although perception mey have been understood.

the Nter.a1 for reasoning;

rooson carried on fram there.

Sense provided

In the later Essay,

~Gnse

wins the sane emphasIs and is explaIned in a sinai Jar fashion, but the rest

pi cognition Is handled wIth barely a reference to IlreasonH, which does not make
its appearance until nearly the end of the fourth book.

In fact, so much of

pognition has been explained without reason In the bsey that Locke even
~uest'ons

''what room then Is there for the exercise of any other faculty but

putward sense and Inward pereeption?

What need Is there of reason?1I 4!

As Locke answers this question end explains the Important role of reason,
~cscrlbin9 what
~eason

sort of faculty it Is. we seem to recognIze a fami Har friend.

dIrects the process of arranging Ideas and it perceives the connections

petween these Ideas just as reason dId In the early essays.

proofs;

It discovers

It puts then In order to make their connections clear;

heir connection.

and it

fllBkes

rIght conclus'ons. 43

it perceIves

Olstingulshlng reason

':::rom faith, Locke explaIns the use of reason in the fol lowing way:

HReeson ••

• take to be the d i scove rV of the carta I nt yo.· probab n Ity of such propos i t:t on!
:>r truths wh i ch the

arr i YeS at by deduct hms, made f rom such Idess wh i en it

by the use of its natural facultIes, viz., by sensation or reflection. u4J

laS glt

~ea50n

is a discovery, arrived ot by deduction. made frQ'll ideas got from sen-

sation"
~ssays

111 i nd

So the general tone end description seems to be the
and In the

~,SHY

£.orsernfns HtII1i!!l

I:'econci ling the use of the t«)rd
~'H"actieaJly

4·2

&t

llreason

ll

Under:!.tooding.
•

43 1bid •• IV, 17. 3.
4l·,bic[. , IV.

la, 2.

in the early

The difficulty lies in

In the early essays reason

811 the inteUeetool duties of the mind.

iSiaX. IV. 17. 2.

5a1l8

mane~

It CQllJ)Ounded. inferrod J
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C<?nCluded end

rolo.

$0

tn the Essay reason appoor to be relegated to a mInor

forti..

Has his thovry of cognit.ion changed?
The evldem:e is hardly woighty enough to demand sueh a conclusion.

locke

l..Is;es pe rcept i on arid rooson i rt the sense of p<::J.«;rs of the sou I rather than as

distinct faculties·.

Also, just as perception must have been taken for granted

granted throughout the

€,se~.

Sterl ing Lamprecht says:

1\'10 ootOl'lOrthy authors support this V'G1.

i\'ooke supposed that the i:nportance of reason wcs so

universally accepted that he noed not dwel! on it
rand Russell adds:
w.~:)ie

book.

'''''hat

Loc:!~e r~am;

by

lrca!':Cln

1

~n

his Essay o ll45

And 6ert-

is to be gat he rod from his

There 1&. It Is true. a chapter cat led 'Of Reason.' but this Is

Hlainly concerned to prove tilat reason dooti not COR!iist of syllogistic

rea!H)O-

1119.,,46 ,/.
In othor words. as soo often happens t'liti1

enoufJ1;

Loei~,

his meaning is c.lear

he 'has ool'V failed by not carefully delimitIng his words.

In both

accounts. In the early essaj"S and in the EsqaYtsense and reason play the major
r1:.Jes, with perception of different typos (s(.tnse perception, IntuItion, ete.)
as an "I n-betW('>.(!tn" facu. ty.

The theor i os of knor.'1 ledge in the two \iOrks

thon to parallel one another closely.
lends further evidence to

tl

460ertrand Russell,

607.

The fo) h:~1ing outline of parallel texts

conclusion of consistency.

4'Ster1tng Lamprecht, The Morel

(New York, 1918), p. 60.

se«.l

!U!!. Pol 'ti~l

pp'lloS<?!hx

a !il.story 2f WesterlJ fhi,lo§:9Rh,x

2! ,lohn Loc;~

(uew York, 1945), p.

utmSIAl'.., I t«i

ESSAY ~ONCERtn Ii! HltWi

The General Proc:ess:

A.

All ideas originate from
sensation or reflection.

Tile origin of knowledge (at least for
t.he 1_ of nature) is from sense

wqlCr i ence.
PRlt~V

IDEAS (orlgtnel of

PRUtARV NOTIONS

Kn;:M ledge)

from
l)
2)
3)

i

sensation or reflection
Primary qua) ities (solidity)
Secondary It
(color. taste)
Tertiary
II (tn'ler to heat)

from sense experience
e~Ullmp los:

.....................

the mind thinks on;
phantasm. spec t as.
Ideas or having Ideas.

COMPLEX IDEAS
fanned by the mind through:
(J) Compound i ng
(2) RelatIng
(3) Abst ract , "9

KNOWLEDGE
ilpercept i on of the COlll'lOCt i on and
agreement between ideas."
a. By Intuition.
b. By demonstration (I"fl..ason).
fInds proofs; orders; themj,
perce I ves agreement etc.

p•

~/hat

•

.. ti . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

·-but known facts are given to reason,
SQ1'Ie truth that is given and
(C:.A~LEX

perceiv~

IDEAS)

reason works by: "formi n9 and cooposi ng new ones ll (i .e. images): llarrangi n9

ImafPS.

.............
., .... ...
• •••••••.••••
. . . . . . . . . . 41 . . . . . . . . . . . . .

.,

a.

4' • • •

b. By rooson: fro.11 sense experio.nee.
a rgoes from one th i n9 to anoth4'l r •

reason is:

lla facy 1ty of manll

lie discovery of the cartalnty
or probability of such propositIons
wnadl the mind arrived at by deduc~ ion. fron such Ideas whieh it has
qJt ••• by sensation or reflection. II

ltv.

matter. mot ion,

visible structure of the
worM.

~-"'Whatever

Perception - taking notice of

(elements for
k.now I edge)

18. 2)

lithe faculty of arguingll
lithe discursive faculty which edvEmCC!

fron things unknown to things

f<.nol1n,

and argues from one thIng to anoth<:n" In
a definite order of propositions. 1I (p.
149)

•
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t. On innate

id~a$:

Book I t Chapter 2 of the Essay
is devoted to proofs showing
t~lat we have no innate principles
or

idE~as.

lilt has bean only an empty
assert ion, th&t the souls of ,lleO
when they ~a4e born are soo'letiling l'llvr
than e:,;pty tablets capable of receiv
ing all sorts of imprints b1Jt having
nO:lC stcupcd on ttlom by natul*e. u (p.
137)

D. On the knowledge of God:
We Mve certain knowledge by
of'gwoont of our OOIn cont I ngent

C:1C

existence.

We have certain k~ledge by the
argl.lnent fran des i 9n.

E. On the basis of morality:

0·'

l'The idea
a Supreme Being • • •
whose workmansh I p \"Ie ara • • .;
~nd the Idea of ourselves, as
understanding. rational beings,
• • • tlould • • • afford suc.h
foundations of our duty and rules
of action ••• " (IV. 3, IS)

The burden of the whole series of

essays Is to prove that because God
exists and we are subject to Him, we
therefore are bound by the natural
law placed over us •

f. On the demonstrab tIl ty of

morality:

"I doubt not. but from self"
evident principles. by necessary
consequences, as Incontestable as
those In mathemat i cs, the measure
of right end wrong might be 'made
out." (tV. 3, IS).

Hln fact it seems to me to follow
Just as necessarily from the nature
of man that, if he is man, he is

bound • • • to observe the law of
nature, as it follows from the natur

of a trian~Je that, if It Is a
triangle, Its three angles ere equal
to two right angles."

(p. 199)
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Earlier It \<Jas noted that two important problems must be dealt with regard ...
ing the consistency of the eptstem::>logy contained in the Essay! .2!
Uature and the E.!saX ConelilrnJ!!fJ t!uman Understanding.
~erned

the use of the term llreasonll j

o comparison

!h! ~ .2.f

The fl rst problel'l'I con-

the second problem before us now Involves

of texts which 1$ not at all favorable to a verdict of consistency

in favor of Locke.

The canparlson looks to Lockets views on the extent of

human knowledge.
G. On the extent of human knowledge:
Ilfteason, though it penetrates

"For al' this sort of learning.
whatever Its extent (and it certain"
1y tl8$ made great progress) f
traverses the whole world. and Is
not confined within any llmits. 1I
(p. 12S)

into the depths of the sea and

earth, elevates our thoughts as
high as the stars • • • . yet it
comes far short of the real extent
of even corporeal being; and there
are many Instances where It fafls
us. 1i (IV. 17, 9)
'~ur

liAs loog as these two faculties
serve one another, • • . there is
nothing so obscure • • • that the

ignorance is great, •••

launch not out Into that abyss of
darkness • • • out of a presumption
that noth I n9 t s beyond our comprehension. 1I (IV, 13.22)

mind, capable of everything could
not apprehend it by reflection and
reason t if supported by these two
facu 1ties. II (p. )47)
Q

locke's statements on the extent of knowledge as totally inconsistent with
locy,e's mature thought expressed in the EssaX Conccrnins HUlIl8~ Understi?~i,!S.

For P. G." Lucas had this to say in an erticle for tho f.J11J..;.()sophi.E,al ,g,~!.£!ly.:
:'But one of the features of tile c!"'seys that
".e~!den)

ID')st strongly, Is the

~Iete

strtk~s

absence of

me (though not Or. von

~ny

suggestion of a I Imi-

tation on the combined powers ot rcason and the senses.
be presupposed thrQughout the

es,5~YS,

'rhe mind that has to

for the argument: to make sense at. all. is

39
the <nnlum capax anlmus.,,47

unlimited In Its range.

fII8n

Implied in this obJec:tlon is that without a .Ind

could never know the natural law;

and hence since

Locke consider. the mind to be quite limited according to the standards of the

lIllY, man can never

know the natural Jaw.

LOG"'s own criterion, according to

Lucas, rules out the posslbi llty of knowing the law of nature.
The first thing to be noted In this objection i. Hr. Lucas' apparent mis·
understanding of the phr... OIIAIUII §:!2!! anllRUs.

To say that the soul I. capa-

ble of all things Is not the .... as to NY that man therefor. does comprehend
all things or even can exhaust the knowledge of aU thln9s.
c:apeble of unlimited knowleclge, but It is

on matter limits Its renge of knowledge.

,_ned

The soul itself Is

In _tter.

Its dependence

Furthermore. Locke's most explicit

criterion In the later liMY Justifies the conviction that the

'aw of nature can

Natural law can be known because It conforms to the criterion of
48
being "according to ....son,u since the Ideas underlying It can be trKed to
be kaown.

sense experience.

But Locke's whole effort .n the early essays wes preclaely

to shaw that knowledge of the Ntural 1_ could be had since the 'deas were
traceable to sen$8 eKper' ..... , and that the deduction was natura. and true.

Moreover. as the previous comparison of text. made clear, Locke believed the
deduction of moral rules to be as certa'A as tho$e from mathematics.

47p • G. Lucas, "Discussion:
(April. 1956). 176.

John Locke,"

I!a

He

philosophical Quarterlx. VI

48'n IV. 17. 23, Locke dIstInguishes between things that are according to
reason. above reason, ancl contrary to reasOft.
U tAccording to reason' are such
propoSitions whos. truth we can discover by __ tnlng and tracing tho•• Ideas we
have from sensation ••• and by rational deduction find to be true or profitable. 1t

40
believed this to be true In the Essays .2!l the
Congernlns Human !.fmIerstandiRJI.

b- .2!

Hasure and In the E!tax

I f Locke Is less confident of human knowledge

In the later Issax. It Is not In respect to the I., of nature, which he left
stilI very much within the limits of human

~ledge.

It would seem, then, thet a eoneluslon of at leest basic consistency between the

b«)

descriptlOfts of human cognition Is warranted.

Idees are ruled out;
Is stressed;
both works;

ampl rh:lsm, particularly knowledge frClm sense experleAGe

the mind works at compounding and c::omperJng In the same way in
and the mind's power of reasoning with certainty Is noted and

described In much the s.-ae manner In both.
the word

tlte8lOfttl

Only the dl fferences in the use of

and the Hmitatlon of the mind', power. called to our atten-

tlOft by Lucas. Indicate any notable deviations.
c:8n

In both, Innate

And both of these, we bel ieve

be explained In a way tbat 'eaves Intact the COASlstenc:y of Locke's thought
It stili may be objec.ted thet the deKrlptlon of cognitIon given in the

!,saYS S!!'!.l!!!. .be g! N,ttu,re Is too fneontplete to allow for any definite proof
of eons I steney.

Th is.. wll I acIm it •

About all that I shere Jntendecl I s to

note that at least no major Inconsistency Is .... rent and that the two de ...
scrlptlons closely para 1 Ie' each other.
When this cognition Is pIKed in the context of knowing the natural law.
and when the statements ora natural law In the .,Iy essays ar. compared to

remarks . . . I n the

Ism

and I ft the lesaM

Imt i Ie .2!!. CI vi J §o!!r'!!!nl.

conclusion of consistency Is even more justified.

the

It has been the source of

speculation that Locke did not feel that he eould ....sonably justify a system

morals based on the lew of nature, or that the leenness of his treatment of
natura. I.., In the Essey Indicates a lack of confidence In tbe concept or even

0
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a rejeetlon of It.

Such speculation tIIo8y be profitable.

What Is far more

valuable. however, Is to GOnsle"r what Locke ac:tually did say.

His remarks on

the law of nature in the I!HY. It Is true, are very meager--meager enough to
fA:=a.;:::;::s;..:r.. Iac:k of conviction in the law.

But his statements, I f carefully

considered, reveal Just as strong a conviction as the eHays 2!! !!:!! !d!!

2!

ture displayed, plus a .....rkilble consistency with those early essays.
Locke's Second Imtll! 2! Slvl! §2verment, In whlGb the law of nature Is made

the beals of his political theory, mani fests the . . . c:onsisteftGy.

Only one

real problem ,resents itM.f 1ft this section, the opinion that Locke leaned more

tON81'ds • hedonlst1c doctrine than to a morality rooted In the law of nature.
The suspiCion _y arise thet only those passages which support a foregone
hilton of consistency haW! been chosen from the

I'HY.

To avoid this,

very ,.,sage49 referring to the natural law in the ISHY twas Men Included In
he comparison given below. plus several other Jmportaftt statements referring to

Unfortunately, Locke makes no attempt to prove a natura' law or how
It i, known in his few statements on the law of nature and mora1lty.

But his

tatelllents do Indicate, In places. the nature and basis of such a proof.
I

ESSAY!

RH !HI LAW OF MATya'

• On knowled90 of the law of nature:
liThe purpose of the second essay Is
"There Is a great deal of dlfferbetween an Innat. law and a law
to prove Just this: that the law of
f nature; between something Imprinted nature can be known by the II ght of
our minds In this very orig, .. 1,
nature.
tLl gilt of nature' I s used in

ACe

4\very pessage except one wh Jch Is SORteWhatt I rre 1evant.
I t occurs 'n I •
• 6, where Locke grants ''that. great part of mankInd gIve testimony to the taw
f ....ture. 1I but he argues that this does not ,rove that the law of nature Is in'"
te.
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and somethIng that we, being Ignorant
of, may attain to the knowledge of by
the use and due application of our
natural faculties.
And I think, they
equally forsake the truth who •••
either affirm an Innate
or deny
th41t there I s a law knowable by the
light of nature. 1I (I, 3. 13)

1_.

t'torallty e".ble of Demonstration-The

tCiU of a Su,remeBeing ••• on

and the Idee of ourselves, as understancUng, rational
belnp ••• would ••• afford such
a foundation of our duty and rules of
action, a. IIlght ,1ace morality
IIIOftglt the sciences capable of demonstratlon." (tv, 3, 18)
wholD we depend;

the same context also: "by saying
something can be known by the light
nature we mean • . • men can attain
It ••• If he MkeS proper use of
his faculties." (p. 123)

0

a.

The two premises. a Supreme BeIng
over us, and ourselves
rational,
.... precIsely the foundatiOftS used in
Locke's argument for proving the law
of nature; Itl_son can lead us to th
knowledge of a l_ker or &onIe superior pawer to whtc:h we are neturall
subject. u • • • "Partly we can infer
a definite rule of our duty from man'
• • • f.cult les. 1I (p. 155)

8. Thet there Is a 1_ of nature:

"That God ha$ given. rule whereby man ahould govern hlaself. no one
Is 10 brut ash as to cIeny. u 8ec:ause

He has the rIght to subject u. a.

creatures, the wisdom to direct us,
end the power to enforce 1_. (t I J 28.
S)

c.

Certainty of the moral 1_:

"Korat ,rlner,I. require ....sonlng
and discourse, and some exercise of the
mind In order to discover the certainty
of their truth • • • • It Is our own
fau I t I f we come not to a carta I n knowledge of them. If (t J 3, I)

Coafer the basic ar.....t of the
fourth essay: "there must be a PfA'lerfu 1 artICf wi.. creator • • •" And I f
this Is so, It follows that IlHe has
not created the world for nothing and
without purpose." From thJs and ft
a realization of our CMn faculties I
can lafer a definite rule of our duty
(p. 157)
After distinguishIng the law of
nature and positive divIne taw. Locke
says: liThe fonner we know with
certainty by the II gilt of Mture and
from rational prlnclples. 1I ( , . 189)

t. lAw of Nature not easi Iy known:
it • • • the i porence where I n _ny
men are of them (I.e. mor81 rules.)"
(I, 3, 1)
''Heft<:e naturally flows the
great varIety of o,lnlons concerning
the moral rules. 1I (t. 3, 6)

HI f In ordinary 11 fe men .eldon
de 1va I nto the i r purpose I n 11 fa. • •
« it. s not to be wondered at thetaf
nature men's opinions are so differ-

ent."

(p. 135)

I

• Actual practice follows the I_
of fashion:
the greatest part of men
shall find to govern themlelves
hlefly, if not solely by the Jaw of
feshloni and, so they do that which
ps them In reputation with theIr
tcorapany, Jittl. regarct the laws of
, or mag'strate." (II, 28, 12)
If

•

•

•

"For most peop'e are Ii tt Ie concemad about their duty; they are
guided not so much by reason as either
by the example of others or by traditional customs and the fashion of
the eount ry. H
(p. J35)

There remains. however, one crucial problem and apperent conflict in Locket
heory which is left untouched by the parallel

t~ts.

Iy, or even the prImary, basis of morality for Locke?

Is the natural law the

That It Is would seem

lmost Incontestable after Locke remarks that "this (natural law) Is the only

rue touchstone of moral rectltude. uSO

And yet we read In Thllly's COIIftentary

Locke's ethics an almost diametrically opposite conclusion:
I rlcal theory of ethics, Which ends In egoistic hedonlsm. IIS1

"Locke offers an
The fact that

ocke has frequently mentioned the I .. of nature ancf God's wi I J In respect to
,.Ilty, only modIfIes the conclusion mildly:

''TIll. (Locke IS theory) is the

ld Greek Hedonistic InterpretatIon of morality, supl1emented by a narrow con'"
tlon of Christi." theology.1I 52
Nor Is Thilly alone In hls,lnterpretation.

Others, though not statIng It

utte so strongly, conclude that Locke counters natural law with hedonlSlft In his
thles. S3 If theIr conclusiOllS are correct, then .. certainly have an almost

SO!ntsax, II, 2,
8
S1Frank Thllty,

a•

AHisto£r if Phi J0!2!hX

(New York, 1914), p. 322.

521b1d •
Slrhls Interpretation of hedonism in much of Locke's ethics Is given by
• R. Morris In Lsike. 8erke.el' Hums (Oxford, 1930). by W. T. Jones In
Istor .2! Wester'! r.hU~iNewYork. 19S2). and in a IDOdlfied way by Sterling Lamprecht In The Mora and Political Philos
of John Locke New York I I

A

incredible IIlncongruitytl In the doctrine of

II

llan who argued vigorously in his

early essays that manls self-Interest is not the baSis of natural law. 54

The hedonistic laterpretation of Locke Is clr."" principally from an
unusual description Locke gave to "good" and Hevll".

In look II, chapter 20

of the IsHY he states quite frankly: "Things then are good or evil only In
ref.~

to pleaaure or pein.

That we call 'good' which Is apt to cause or

Increase pleasure, or diminish pain In us; ••• and on the contrary, we .....

that 'evll t which Is apt to produce or Increase any pain, or clJl8lnlsh any
pleasure In us.uSS

When we reed that things are good or evil in reference to

pleaaure or pain, It Is not surprlslAt to find Interpreted conclusions such as
this:

·tyhe question arlMS, how did such moral , . . ever come to be estebllshecl t

haw hal the knowledge of right and wrong been acquired?

Pleasure aDd pain ar.

the gr.at teachers of morality accordlns to our . .lrlclst_,,56

PI.aure and

pain, then, mark off what is good or evil, and the ... of nature really has

very I ittl. practical bearIng.
II th'l the theory Locke Intends?

Flrlt, it could be argued that no one

who has 10 conSistently stressed one Idea. such .. the natural law 8. the true

norm of RIOr.lIty, will suddenly rever.. hll field

$0

Inexplicably.

But there

also ..... to be sufflcient evhlenee In his own tIItONS to warrant « more con..

slstent statement of hIs cIoctrlne.

The cUfflGUhy appears to •• e less with

Locke's thought than In his broad and rather _'guous use of tams.

S4,S!!XI. pp.
SS!!

205-21S.

EstlX. II. 20, 2.

>'rhilly, p. )23.

The

l.,leasureH and "paln", for instance. signify IWhatsoever delight or uneasiness
1$ felt by us. 1I57

Furthermore, one or other of them "Join thellftselvos to alBut it Is God who has

most all our Ideas both of sensation and reflect ion. 1158

effected this fixing of pI_sura and pain onto ideas In order to fIOtivate us. 59
Nowhere. h<:Mever, does Locke state or even suggest that we should

JudI!

the goodness or evil of aGts by the pleasure or pain they bring, which Is what
ThfUyand others idlply.

Nowhere does Locke say that It is pleasure and puin

whh:.h cause or determine a thing to be called good or bad.

In faot, if we

read Locke carefully, we flnct thlt he states the exaot opposite.

HPleasure

and ,.In, and that which CMlH' them, good and evil, are the hinges on which our

passions turn. u60

In other words, ... ac:t, an object. or
And depending

Oft

idea Is objectively good or evil.

.t. . . .'a.

which It Is, It.1I 1 result In pleasure or pain.

this allgMI8At •• norm Is stili needed to
ba4.

8ft

But with

what is objectively ggocI or

That aorra Locke hils al ....dy noted--natura}

Reason would stili re-

tain Its function of cHsc:overfng the prlncl,... to be used in mora. Judpllmts.
All that has been added Is the fact that ,I.sure and pain weigh heavily in the

fIOtivatton of HC'.

NacI Locke only introduced or made

Il10'. ex,llcit one

idee

fn his natural 1_ theory. this .... rent conflict would not have arlsGn or at
least would not have loomed so lar,..

57A!1 bux, '" 2.0, 15.
58,bid., II, 7. 2.
59'bld •• II, 7, 3.
60'bld., II, 20. 3.

The Idea which he left unclarified Is

that of man's ultImate end, happiness.

ThIs OIIllsslon, we shall see later. Is

the major weakness In Locke's ar. . .nt for the vel idlty of the law of nature.
If Locke's natural law doctrine demands that man act out of the sheer, unselfish motive of servl", God's glory, while his treatment of good end evil
shows men egotistically motIvated by pleasure and pein elone. we do Indeed
sense en tACOn$lstency In ht, thinkIng.

But the two e.Kplenatlons can be

synthe,tacl end probably were joIned In Locke's mind, though he failed to

expre., It cl .. rly.

Manl, happiness or pleasure and God's glory ere not

oppoMCI to each other.
followl",

God'.

In serving God's glory, we achieve happIness.

will as exprelsed In the nature'

happi_s to ourselves.

1_.

\118

8y

glorify Him and brins

J. V. Gough concurs that this Is Locke's true mind.

"But the way to get happiness. (ac:c:or4lng to Locke) was to obey the will of

God.·,61
Locke himself __ s this clear when he returns to the subject of morality

In Book I •• 28, 5.

"Moret gaod and evil t thea, Is only the conformity or dis-

ag.....nt of our voluntary actions to some I." whereby good end evil Is drawn
on us from the will end powr of the l ....ker, which good end evil, pleasure or
peln, attendS ... our

obse~

or breach of the ' . , by the decree of the law-

maker, II that which we Mil -reward' end 'punishment , •.,62
I t seems then that we can cone 1ude thet Locke' 5 genera 18th Ical theory is
consiltent.

This does not __ that It's

''one, hennonlous whole," which,

6,.1. W. Gough, John Locke's Political Phllos9P!!Y, (Oxford, 1950), p. 8
62

!n IssaX,

II, 28, 5.

wit
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Lanprecht, we admit Is not the case. 63

Locke's words are too ambiguous, his

synthesis too Incomplete, to conclude to perfeet unity_

But, as has been

mentioned before, It is hIs basic thought that concerns us, and as Gough wisely

notes, lias generally with Locke, we shan miss the point If we Insist too much

on verbal mlnutlae. lI64
Not only do statements on the law of nature In the Essay shQ1 a remarkable

consistency with the fuller enunciations of the I.- In the early essays, but
this consistency remains, moreover, when we pess over to Loeke's

2!! ,'vll

Gov.rmen~.

Treatls.

In this famous treetise Loeke made the natural 1_ and

a state of nature the foundatfons of his political theory.
weak att.,t In the

.l~

liMY to show

Bec:ause of the

how the 1_ of Mtur. Is known, and since no

effort Is made In that regard In the treatise Itself. the ,., of nature was
adjudged to be a fl.-.t of Locke's I_ginatlon totally Inconsistent with his

epistemology_
In the light of the essays recently published, such a claim ean hardly be

defended.

In the eslays, knowledge of the law of nature Is clearly fonnulateel

That the law of nature di&cussed In the eSMYI does not differ from that pre-

"Ateet tn the T....tl .. should be evident In

the comparIson which follows.

The

pun,.. In whlGh the I., of nature Is mentaoned In the Treatise are too numerous to list theM ell. but the .ssentlal ones wll 1 be noted.
Locke's ffrlt Treati!! !!!!. Civil l<r!!rment offered a refutation of Sir
Robert Filmer's clivi. right principles.

--------

63Sterllng lAmprecht,
(New York, 1918), p. 103.
64

Gough, p. 23.

1he

Koral

!!!!

The

J.!en4

Treatise. with which we

PoUtig) Phl1osop1:!X

2.f

John !r.<x:ke

lare deal ing--tho law of nature.

Tho following out) Joe indicates the con-

sistenc:y of the texts from the Trea$i5El; as compared with the texts from the
~rly

essays.

lECQJ!{ TRlAT t SE Qfi
~.

GQViRtliE~5

The natural law: Its force, its
basis, its precepts:

arhe state of nature has a law of
Inature to govern it, which obi iges
!everyonei t and reason ii which Is that
law, teaches a 11 men who wIII but
iCOnsu I tit.. that be i ng ali equa J and
In~nt, no one ought to harm
~notheriti In his life. health.
liberty or possessIons." (I" 2, i)

... B• IIReeson. II in th I s context
poviously refers not to the faculty
!but to principles to be ~sulted.
~his usage is noted In the early
!essays on page III t though i t . siess
frequently used.
~.

I) f JHenee no one can doubt that
this law is binding on all human
beings. 1I (p. 2.11)
i i) After referring to right reason t
Locke says: liB), reason, I do not

think Ir. moant here that faculty of
undGrstanding ••• but certain

defInite principles of action."
(p. lit)
III) l'1'he ,.., of nature altogether
forbids us to offend or Injure any
private person without cause. 1i
(p. 1(3)

Certainty concerning the Jaw;

Locke tells us that it Is beyond his
purpose to study particulars of the law

lef nature but that:

lilt is certainiv
there Is such .. law, and ttNtt too, as
intelligible and plainv to a rational
creature and • studler of that law as
the pos I t I VG laws of COllIDO. . . . . th, M)'
possibly plainer." (lit 2. 12.)

Iv) The law ot nature ICWe kncM with
certainty by the light of nature
and from rad 008 i pri ncl p JfbS. II
(p. 189)
v) l'Though, no doubt, it is oot
made k\~ in the same way as

It is sufficiently
to man," (p. 113) and at

pos'tl\~ l~i5_

k~'In

tlllleS "50 mcmlfest and c:ertein that
nothing can 00 plainer." (p. 2(1)

65o.uotations from John L.ocke, .l)2 Treati!!!, 2!! Clv' t §2verl1OO...!lt. ed. W. S.

Carpenter (London, 1924).
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C.. Necessary that It be promulgated:

"For nobody can be under a 1_
that is not promulgated to him; and
this law being promulgated or made
known by reason on I y • • •u
(II, S, 17)

"He must know beforehand that there

is a lawmakeru and that "there Is

some will on the part of that superior power with respect to things
to be done by us. 1I
(p. 151)

i. God Is Its promulgator and author:

The rules, I.e., of men's actions,
st "be conformable to the law of
natu.... I.e. to the will of God, of
ich that's. ckclaratlon. H
(II, ... 135)

''For God, the author of this law.
has willed It to be the rule of our
moral life. and He has made It sufficiently known. 1I
(p. 187)

E. The I., Is eternal and universal:
~

''I'hus the law of nature stands as
eternal rule to all men. 1I (II. II,

13S)

The seventh essay Is entitled end
treats of: Ills the Binding Force of
the 18I of Nature Perpetual and
Universe1?1i

Locke answers" uYes. 1I

(p. 191)
• Civil laws based on It:

"The munlelpa' 1.,. of countries,

feh are only so far right as they

re founded on the I., of nature, by
hlch they are to be regulated and
Interpreted." (II, 2, 12)

I~ of civil magistrates derIve
their whole force from the containIng power of natural law. 1I (p. 189)

• two fundamental precepts:

"Everyone as he I s bound to prerye himself, and not to quit his
tation Wilfully, ••• so by the
11 Ice reason • • • ought he as much
s he can to ,reserve the rest of
nklnd. 1I (II, 2, 6)

Man feels himsel f Impelled:

soc I ety • • • in fact as much as he
Is obliged to preserve himself.1i
(p. 157)

In the course of both the essays and the

recepts of the I., of nature are mentioned.
ssa s ga the

lito

be prepared for the me I ntenance of

S~

Treatise, several other

They vary somewhat.

In the

.Ir.e! S!! Natu,re, for Instance, precepts regarding the worship of

, self-preservation, mocIesty, friendship, justice and others are called to
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attentIon.

In the Second Treetlse precepts on self"preservatlon. and particu-

larly precepts on justice are Injec:ted.

In

SOfil0

cases the precepts overlap.

aut nowhere do they openly confHct with each other, so that we can pass over
them without too much C(..)ncern.

Fragnentary as all these ideas may be, they mesh well wIth what Loc.ke has
told us previously about the law of nature.

ThrO'.Jghout the three works In-

vest I gated, Locke '5 concept t on of the 1lAW of nature and

how i t t s known

reme i ns

consistent.
Conclusion.
trademark.

According to many commentators, inconsIstency is Locke's

They say that between the doctrine of the fl rst three books of his

Essay and the fourth book lies a gaping inconsistency.

His empJ rical episte'"

mology and his rationalist pol itlce) theory are so divergent. we are told, that
they might well be cited as opposed doctrines.

But a closer analYSis of Locke

tllOUght. an analysis that looks less to trapping him on a strict comparison of
words, and more to perceiving the genera. trains of his thought, wI} J reveal a
sooaewhat smoother theory of cognition and morality.

Richard Aaron, without

wrenching or distorting Lockels thought. has shoNn how such a sympathetic
analysis can be made of his epistemology.
Locke's treatment of the law of nature Is less difficult to reconcile.
The same leading thoughts and COf'lvletions carry through each of the three works
studies In thfs thesis.

It may be argued, and Justly, that Lockels treatment

is very Inadequate and that a fuller analysis on his part might have involved
him In Innumerable difficulties.

This is quite true.

All we have Is a

thread of his thought.
But It Is equally evident that this thread runs
through his entire theory, a consistent thought and conviction.
It seems at
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times ['lOre a belief than a reasoned doctrine, but at least it is a belief unshaken by his method of critical analysis which devastated luan't another stronghold.

There is a law of nature and reason, I imited though It may be. can kriowit
\'Ihoo it works fron sense experience.

CHAPTER IV
ARE LOCKE! S ARGiJ-tElfl"S FOR KNa\lLEOGE
(IF THE t4ATURAL LAW VALID?

This thesis contains a dual problem:
course, had only the tatter one In mind.

c:onsisteney and validity.

Locke, of

He detennined to prove that there is

a law of nature binding on Dll men which can be naturally known.

His argument,

unfortunately, rembles over '.l3ny pages, treatins first one aspect and then an'"
other.

Worse yet, his words and

and c:onelseness.

develo~~t

of proof woefully lack precision

These facts leave the door wide open for interpretations of

his thought which ean very much affect the val hUty of his proofs.
cisely lies the difficulty in evaluating Locke·s
iI~cepted!l

ar~aent.

Here pre-

If the apparently

InterpretaUoal of Locke's ar91..1l'llf.IDt by Dr. von Leyden is adil1itted.

then the crIticisms made would seem to be true and Locke's proof is simply invalid.

But Is von Leyden *$ Interpretat ion

sis of locke's arguments be f'ilQde which wi 11

(;.OJ~rect?

And if not, can an antdy-

~llOnstrate

the val idity of his

ar9~nts1

locke's arguments. fortunately, can be arraw.Jed for either interpretation,
von Leyden's or one more favorable to Locke, into a four-fold division which
matches the four-fold criticism made by von Leyden.

The procedure then, after

an initial, overall dIscussion of the two interpretations of Locke, will be to
consider each stage of the two interpretations and to evaluate locke's proofs hi
the light of both.
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first, then, von Leyden's overall suamary of Locke's reasoning should be

noted:
The I ioo of my enqul ry \'Ii JJ follow what i take to be the 'ogical
steps of his argument.
They are briefly these: Locl<.e passes from the
factual statement that man possesses reason to the conclusion that reason
is his essential characteristic, and hence to the assumption that reason
leads to the discovery of mora' truths. and if properly employed, to the
discovery of one and the sane set of roora) truths, i.e. natural law.
Fran this he Is led to infer ethical assertions to the .ffect that the
mora' standards discovered by reason are thenselvos rational and that they
are c:Cl1lJlands bind i Rg on a 11 men. and hen<:e to the assort i on that the
validity of such COO1i'l&flds can be proved, and even S£lOl'll1 to be nocessary in
the 6eJIe way as a geometrleaJ demonstration. l

Von Leyden then criticizes L.ocf<e In this argl.lllent for making
leaps between different planes of kl'kMledge.
~in9uish

Locke, he ny5, failed to dis'"

between four different types of propositions:

(2) statements concerning the operation of reason;

(4) logIcal truths.
~

~rranted

(I) factual statements;

(3) ethical assertions;

If Locke and other exponents of the nature' Jaw llhad sort ...

out the various statements ImpliCit In their doctrine and had noted thet "it

s not eheys possible to pass

f~11

one statement to another t thei r argt,lnents

flight well have lost the conviction which they have carried throughout the

~ges.u2

\Ion Leyden Is particularly c:oneerned with the attempt to pess from

lratters of feet. or non-ethical statements, to ethical conclusions.
VOR

Leyden's position. then. is th.s:

sing reason leads to moral truths;
re binding,

s rational.

these truths .:lre thansolves rational;

they are universally true.

Man is rational;

locke argues that man Is rationel;
they

The emphasis Hes on the fact that

therefore. man ought to act rationally.

~3n

There

S4
are moral truths;

therefore. they ought to be followed.

It is this sort of

transition fron IIls" to "ought" that von leyden sees as particularly invalid.
But such an interpretation as this misses tho point of the argu.11ent, and

does not account for the true origin of obI i get ion..

Von leyden has man per"

celvlng that he is rational, looldng for rules by which to guide himself. find ..
ing the natural law. seeing that It befits him, end concluding ti1et it must
obi 1ge him.

Locke, however, seems rather to focus on God's existence as a fat/giver.

rrhe

Jaw and Its existence arise pr'_rily from the fact that God, the creator,

eJtists and governs all things with a purpose.

In fact, once we have arrived at

the conclusion that there Is e God who h~ the author of all things, lithe notion

F;>f a universal law of nature binding on all men necessari Iy emerges. il 3
I\'oweyden stresses mants raUonal ity;

Von

Locke seems rather to center on God's ex'"

Istence as a lawgiver and all -wIse Creator.

Von Leyden has Locke arguIng fr~n

:nan's ratIonality through his discovery of moral truths and on to thei r binding
force and validtty.

A more exact Interpretation, 8S the examlnatfon of the

texts WhIch follows should beer out, would have locke 9J;ng from God's overali
~vernance of the world, to man l ,

law of nature.
~uthored

participation in this Qrder by means of the

The law. in turn, obI iges men beeeose they recognize It as

by God.

Hence, if we fonaw the central nne of LocI(O's thought. not worrying too
much about his vagueness or ineptness at clear expression.

\ie

wi 11 find a sub-
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stantlal1y val id argument.

If the text of Locke's ossays is earefully studied

a thread af argument far more consistent than von Leyden has indicated reveals
itself.

In proving that the low of

natu~

can be tc.oowo as man's rule end guiOc.

and the ",., i s of a 11 I aw and ll'lOra I i ty. Locke fee I s that: it i Ii necessary to

danonstrate four things:

the existence of the law of Mture;

shCMlng that It has been promulgated;

and universality.

As a result, his

Its binding force.
ar~nents

its knowebi I ity.

and its perpetuity

fall into four dlvisions f al-

though Locke did not d i st 'ngu hHi them as such ~
t)
II )

III)
IV)

A proof that there is a law of

nElture{Es~ys:

, &. II).

A proof that tl1 i 5 I aw can be known by us (f: ssay I V) •

A proof that the

lat~

Is binding on all men (Essay vI)"

It proof that It is perpetual and universal (Essey VII).

This four-fold division corresponds to von teyden's divisIon of Locke's
argument into the four type! of propositions usect.

n
h~f

I n the open 1"9 Essay, lQc'.ke offers hi s proofs for the ex is tence of e

of nature.

various places.

Actually his

e,.~nts

on this one point ere repeated In

What we believe Is Locke's central argument reappears in

several places In the initial essays:

in the introductory paragraph of the

fi rst essay. in the fi rst and thi rd erg&MDents in that essay, and again In the

last section of the second essay.
Von Leyden In his first criticism, after discussing locke's ambiguous use
of the word

~'reason:'.

and aftor deal ing wIth the fot"lTlal proofs presented by

L,ocke, eoneludes b}' noting:

''rhus far. then. Locke's starting point is simple:
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it consists in tho factual statement that man can reason. iI
Nere the C',:mtent Ion begins.

~.

Is this locke's starting point?

Von leyden

evidently ca.71e to this conclusion after analYZing locko'S first pro;)f if. ESSD~f

I.

In that proof, locke drm'1$ from Aristotle an arg'.mlCnt that lithe special

function of man is to exercise his :l1ind's facuities in accordance with rationc:d
princlPles. IIS

Aristotle. locke n.:>tas, has shcMt/n by various examplos that there

Is a special sort of work each thing is designed to perform. and "in the end 00
rightly concludes that the proper function of man Is acting in conforiflity with
reason, so mucn so that man must of necessity perfor,n \'\Illat reason prescr!bes. lI1S
From this initial arguraent y,::>n leyden evidently arrrivaci at his conclusion

that Loeko's starting poillt is Hman can reason H and that ilmoreovcr. it Is frolll a

merely factual statement

conet~rnin9

man's essential nature that the moral propo-

sition is Inferred that he has a duty to i ivc. in CO\lTOrmlty with this nature. il7
Unfortunately, thls initial argument of Locke's, which is far f.-OOI being his
best, seems to be the foundation for v<)n leyden's whole interpretation of Locko

in

essays.

these

saying:

So much so. that von leyden wi II later interpret locke as

"God·s purp;,Jse in erecting man was the',; he should live according to

8

reason. II

Of course, locke must share the Mane because he leaves the concept

4Essaxs, p. 46.
Von leyden1s introduction eoos on page 95.
References
to pages under HlO should be attributed to von Leyden; over page )00 should be
attributed to locke.
511~;lId
.s.2.!.:::.' • p. Ii 3 •
6 lbid •

-

7Ibid. f p. 46.
8!bid •• p. 30.
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~f

the final end or gt'Hili of ffir'3n insufficiently e'l(pJained.

This, as will
But it

:lOOS

be
stU i

not justify von leyden's wrong interpretation.
To return, however, to t!w starting point of LlXke'S

says it is simply IIman can rcason."

~r9u\,lent.

Von Leyden

Be overlooks, howev..ar t a very important,

long introductory paragraph of the fi rst essay_

The paragraph treats God IS

axhtence and rlis governing power as manifest in the world.

VOI1

Leyden may

lave considered this merely a prelude to Locke·s Ulought, but in fact. it con'"
!'ains the heart of his proof.

The whole discussion 00 reason presupposes this

ntoll igel1tly regulated world spoken of in Lockets vory first words:
Since God shows tii,l'IS lef to us as present ever)l\'IIhere • • . t I aSSU!1.le
there will be no one to deny the existence of God • • • • This thon being
taken for granted, and it would be wrong to doubt it, namely. that SOTle
divine being presides over the Irrorld ..... for it Is by \-tis order that the
heavens revolve in unhroken rotation • • • and there is flOthing so unstable
so uncertain. tn thIs whole constitution of things as not to have a rule
appropriate to its nature--it seems just therefore to inquire whether inan
alone has come into the world altogether ex~apt from any taw applicable to
himsel f.9

Nearly all the major st(;PS In ilis argument, later to be amplified, arc con~ained

here in germ.

~ture

has its laws,

God oxists;

He presides over the world;
•

it would seem, also has h.s law.

all phYSical

10

locke will argue

9. bid., p. i 09 •

l00nce locke concludes to the existence of a \-lise Creator, he should n"l.ll1:.e
he trans i t Ion f as he does in the fou rth essay. that a wise Creato,- cannot act
rlithout purpose.
This impiles that God intends bot;, an ultimate end for aii
n I ngs. and the means or I aws by wh i eil these til i figs may reach the 1r end.
lian is
fie I tided.
God had a speC! nc purpose in crcat ing lilm, and hence Jaws to tluide
h i.'1 to that end.
Out locke is not a h~ays So e)tp'l i ci t, as i 5 the case here. where he see:ns to
ile arguing that. only bocaust;;o all otoor thi;'gs act according to definite laws,

nan should also.

that. since God does nothing t'fitho;.!t e purpose, man must c)lso be included in

design

God1s

and

laws.

Locke, then, would seen to be arguing Itby descent" from God's governance to
man's discovery of how he is governed.

Von Leyden has Locke arguing "by as-

cent ll from manls discovery and the usc of his reason to finding himself under
laws.

Only with this introductory paragraph as 8

p~lse

do we have the proper

context and meaning of locke's arguments, particularly for this first disputed
The cone Jus t on noted by von leyden that lithe mora 1 propos It' on is i n-

proof.

ferred that he has
made by Locke.

II

duty to Ii vo In conform I ty with tM 5 nsturo ll1J is indeed

But the Inference Is not fr01l I'man Is rational," to 'man must

act rationally,li but rather from ''man is designed to act according to his nature
for a necessary purpose," to u man must act rationally.1I

At this precise point

the transition from "lsI! to "ought" Is legitimate, where the absolute moral
necessity of the end Is conditioned by the moral acts leading to the end.

In

support of the position that this latter inference is the one Locke really had

In mind, the following facts can be noted:

n

The third argument in this ftrst essay develops from God's overall

design in the world to man's participation in this design or law.

Thus In at

least one other proof the order follows that of the latter pos it ion mentioned
In this third argument" Locke argues from the constitution of the woric

above.

Itwherein all thi ng' observe a fixed law of thei r ope rat ions and a manner of
existence appropriate to thei r nature.!1

11

~ss,axs. p.

12

46.

Ibid:... p. 117.

12

All thi "gs created, Locke tells us,
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~re

subject to God's Jaw, so that It would not seem that man alone Is Independ-

~nt

while all else is bound..

For it does not befit a wise Creator that he

.hould form an animal endowed Babove al i others with mind. intellect, reason,
_nd all the requisites for WOrking,lil) and then have no purpose in mind for him,
~thin9

for him to achieve.
In the disputed argument derived fron Ari&tot;le. the fact that .Ithe

2)

special function of man is the active exercise of the mind's facultles u14 foUow
'the preceding passages (In which) he had stl<X"In by various examples that ti1ere

is a special sort of work eaeh thing is designed to perform. 1I15

tn the light

of Locke's opening paragraph, this "designed to performil certainly refers to the
notion that God has created all things for a necessary purpose or goal, which

necessity gIves rise to the ethical obI igatloo.
But a stronger and almost irrefutable proof that the inference Locke

3)

Intends Is from God's law to man's participation through his use of reason, is

found In a particularly algniflcant remark found in the seGOnd essay.

After ra

stating his argument, this time In terms of how the natural law fs known. Loeke
says:
• declared that the foundation of all knowledge of it (i .e., the law of
nature) Is derived from those things which we perceive through our senses.
From these things, then, reason and the power of arguing, which are both
distinctive marks of man, advance to the notion of the maker of these
things . . . . and at last they conclude and csleb) ish for themselves as
certain that some Deity Is the author of all these things.

13!~!!t.

-

141b1d ., ,. 113.

15 ,b1d •
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But then Locke cont i nues:
As soon as this Is laid dawn, the notion of a universal law of nature
bl"11n9 on 191 i men necessar.ly emerges, and this wi 11 become clear later
on.
What does the

l!!l!.

refer to in the phrase ilas soon as this I s laid down"'?

I t can on 1y refer to the fact that "God I s the author of a It th I ngs. II

Haw th is

Inference Is made. locke tells us, ''will become clear later on," referring to
the argument of the fourth essay.

To that argument we can turn our attention

now •
• 1)

The argument of the fourth essay falls into von leyden's second cate-

gory of critlclsm. concerning statements about the operation of reason.

Most

bf von Leyden's discussion covers points referring to locke'S arguments against

the origl n of the knowledge of moral rules from innate ideas, tradi tion. or from
the consensus of mankind.

But towards the conclusion of this section von leyda

takes up the fourth essay. indicating rather accurately this
Locke's proof.

tln~

the course of

Von Leyden withholds his criticism for the most pert until the

next sect Ion.
tn Essay IV. locke first discusses why reason and sense experience must war
together to discover the natural law.

Then fn order to know

.2 sense experien

and reason can lead us to the knowledge of the natural law "cartal n feets must
first be set forth. because they ere necessarily presupposed in the knowledge of
any and every law. 1I17

l6'bld., p. 133.

17'bld •• p. 151.

e
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First, In order that anyone may understand that he Is bound by a law,
he must know beforehand that there is a law-maker. i.e •• some superior
power to which he Is rightly subject.
Secondly, it is also necessary to
know that there Is some will on the pert of that superior power with
respect to the th i ngs to be done by us. that is to say, that the f aw-maker •
whoever he may prove to be, wishes that we do this but leave off that, and
denands of us that the conduct of our life should be in accordance with his
will.
In what follows it will become clear what sense experience contributes and what reason does, In order that these tt,1O presuppoisltlons, If
which are requl red for knowledge of the law of nature. may be known to us.
Locke takes for granted the
~wo

l'majC)!·II

premise of his syllogism, that these

condItions are the necessary notes for a law.

Put he works at length to

prove that these condi t ions are ful fil led in respect to the natural law.
~~in9

After

how we discover the regularity and art of the world, and especially the

peeul iar enda.nents of man, we arrive at a conclusion that lither. must be some

~uperior

r.eeded

power to which we are ri£htJy subJect. lli9

And this was the first thin!

for the knowledge of any law.

locke's argument cont i noes as he moves on tt' the second cond i t Ion, and

Showl

"hat this superior power (God) has some wi II as to what He wants us to do.
argunent moves frQll cause to effeet:
~.xlsts

~Id
.0

Hence, I'K'\ says, 11ft

~ol!ows

fl"OOl

cr~.ated this world for nothing and without purpose.1I 20

He

not create without purpose because to work without a fixed aim Is contrary

such wisdom;

,ucn

We have shown, Locke says, that there

a powerful creator who h aho wise.

this that lie has not

The

also it can hardly be believed that God wouJd endow man with

great faculties and then heve nothing In mind for him to do.

18 lbid •

19'bld •• p. 153.

-

20'bld •• p. 157.

"Henee,"
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Locke concludes, itit was the second of the two things required for the knowled
of any and every law. 1I21
Now the problan Is:

what Is that "somethlngll L'Ihich God tntends for us to

Here Locke becomes rather weak and vague.

$0 far his argument Is vailci~

though far from eonplete In filling In detaUs.

Regularity and design are ob-

do?

served In the world.
Ing the world;

but these Indicate a wise and purposeful creator govern..

the wisdom and purpose must extentl to all things;

therefore

man Is Included under this governance in a way appropriate to his nature.
Of course today such. proof would have to be highly refined and tightiy
ordered, sInce as It stands, Locke would be challenged on almost every statement.

Is there regularity?

Cannot the world be its own cause and purpose?

Are the principles presumecl in the argument val id?

etc.

But at least Locke IS

reasoning up to thls point Is adequate, up to the point where he Inquires whet
It

.s that God Intends man to do.

Here again a teleological explanation Is

catled for, but Locke mixes the beginnings of such an explanation with some
Inductive observations.
Locke notes the ultimate end of all things. w.hic.h is Goctts glory.22
Partly from this and partly from manls faculties, wh;ch must be given for some
purpose and therefore can and must be used, we infer manls rule and law.

implication here Is that man must share In

eontrlbu~in9

The

to God's glory, and

22, 'But what It is that f s to be done by us can be partl y gathe red from the
end In view for all things; ••• they appear to be intended by Him for no
other end than Hii own glory, eb1d to this all tilings must be related. 1I Essa}!s.
p. 157.
Locke does not clarify this any farther ..
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~hat

this will be done In a way pecul iar to man, suggested by his own endow-

ments.

Locke indicates no definite final end for man, but only Indicates that

in some way he is to use his faculties tOl..rds God's glory.

And so locke con-

cludes rather weakly that tnus man IIfeels himself disposed and ready to contem'"
plate God's works . . . . and thereupon to render praise •••• Further, he feetJ&
ihlmself not only to be Impelled by I ife's experience and pressing needs to

other men, but also to be urged to
~ter Into society by a certain ergeensitX of nature. i623
~~u~

and preserve a life In society with

-

But what I f man does not fee I hi mse 1f so disposed'?
feel impel led to enter into the soelety of men?

What I s he does not

Locke, of course, may and

probably does mean something more rational than sneer feeling whleh Impel1s us
towards the observance of tbe

law.

But his weakness of expressIon Is Indlea-

tlve of the obscurity In his argllDent.

Because Locke has fat led to make claar

the final end of man. and failed to establ ish It as e qecessarx end. his argu~nt

here f.l1s short of demonstration.

Had Locke shown man's final end to be

assimilatIon to God. whIch thereby ful ft 115 God '!Ii external glory, and had he
established the absolute moral necessity of such an end, his argument would rest

on surer footing.

Then the -'things to be done" IndIcated by Locke would be

seen as necessary means for reaching hIs final end. k.noIIIn by reason and not by

mere feelings.
Within such

8

franework. the obligation to obey the natural law would al"

ready be 'mplled.
But obI igatton, to Locke's way of thinking. Is now fully
established. since the fulfil lment of the two conditions discussed above was

23Esaays, p. 157.

Italics not In the original.

64
sufficient for man to understand that he is bound by the law of nature.

locke

continues on. nevsrthGless. to make more expl icit the obi igation attached to the
Jaw of nature.

III)
~st

He handles this problell1 in the sixth essay.

It Is here on the proble.'D of obligation that von Leyden raises his

serious objection.

Locke, he informs us. at this point makes an illicit.

transition from factual stat.Dents to
In the lest section It

WIllS

ethl~l

assert.ions.

pointed out that Locke failed to make clear the

naGeSsary goal of man from which obligation arises.

But a more serious in-

Kcuraey of definition involves him in even great., trouble.

Von leyden wi 11

argue that Locke flounders bet.ween two explanations for the source of ob I i gat ion
a voluntarist theory, and an intellectual ist theory. nelthe", of which is capable
of assuring binding force.

Locke Imp} icates hh1l$G1f in this difficulty by his

definition or description of natural Jaw early In the first essay:

IlHence, this

law of nature ean be described as being the decree of the divine wi II disccr1:J-

Ible by the light of nature and indicating what Is and what is not in conformity

~ith

rational nature. and for this very reason

~~ing

or prohibiting. 1l24

A "decree of God's will ••• Indicating what Is in conformity with ration-

al nature" Is the definition he 'offers.
the disjunction fastened on by von Leyden.

By this definition Locke sets up in

And

Locl~

does 1 ittle to reconeS te

24'n this particular In$t~nce the latin text will profit us, especially
since von Leyden translates the Lattn word ordlnatlo as Ildeereell • slanting the
translation thereby to an even stronger connotation of something arbitarl1y
wi lied.
liiiaec 19ltur lox natur. Ita deserlbi potest quod sit ordlnatlo voluntatis
dlvinae lumlne naturae cognosclbl1 is, quid em natura ratlonall conveniens vel
disc:onvenlens stt Indlcans eoquc ipso jubens aut prohtbtms. t ! Essay§.,' p. 110.
111.
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lor

~Iarlfy

the "twit positions.

~here is the natural 1_ found?

His definition leaves

mu~h

to be desired.

How and by what Is It constituted?

exactly in what sense Is the law Unatural 1l1

And

Von Leyden sUI'Mt8rizes what he

believes \\QUId be Locke's answer to the last question:
It Is for the followIng reasons, It seeros. that a law thus known Is called
by Locke a natural law: <a> the knowledge of It is acquired by man's
faculties, i.e. "n$ation and reason. the joint exercise of which constitutes what Locke calls the light of nature; In other words, It Is a law
promulgated by God in a natura' way. I.e. It Is other than a positive I .
which is known by revelation; (b) it Is e law In confonaity with the
natural constitution of the universe and, particularly, with the nature of
man; (c) the precepts of this law are the sane for all men and, like the
I..,. attaching to natural phenomena but unlike those of different states,
they do not vary from place to place and froll one time to another .2S
The It10st fundamental and Important sense in Which the law of nature is
~inatural"

Is omitted by von Leyden because Locke failed to explain It.

The law

Is natural because it is founded in and constituted by human nature itself.
~he decree or ordination of God directing man to his fincl end took place In the

Ivery

act of creation.

God legIslated for man by creating him, wit Jing that he

Ishould live according to his nature.
~s

For $CampI., man Is a created being and

such has a relaUon to God, hIs Creator.

The relation Is one of depel'ldeftCy

In respect to life and the fulfl·llment of man 1 s clestlny.

Hence

man is obllgat81

to recognize his dependency in adoration.
Human nature, with all Its Implied relationships to God. to self and to
pthers, constitutes the foundation and norm of natural law.
~ke

But Locke did not

this clear in the early essays.
The question arises, could Locke have made claar or consistently held that

66

natural law Is founded In

rnnao

nature?a6

Maurice Cranston, Locke's most

recent b t ographer It charges that Locke did not pub I ish his IlsaX' .2!! She

J.I! gf

tflSYCe because his Interest in empl rlcism was better served In the later IIW
and because title had adlDbrated in that EIHX (notably In hIs section on Wom)
a critical technique which, once applied to the L.aI of Nature, would assuredly
have shown his ca.e to be untenable. lIl7
What Cranston evidently refers to is that Locke argues In Book III of the

IsMY that we cannot
not know man.

know the real essence or neture of a thing.

hence . . . ean-

But what Locke clearly criticizes in Book It I Is the posItion

thet . . can know the sotll ...ence of a thlnt or the MaCt characteristics whld1
distinguish It from .1 J other things.

I.

But this in no way rules out knowing

enough about man to be able to found morality upon his nature.
t

In fact in

800~

Locke very .,llcltly states that IIOrallty fa capable of demonstratIon

te!stul! we have an unche""""e Idea of man .. a corporeal. rational creature.
When we say that ''alan Is subject to 1_. n . . . . . . nothing by '_nil but a
corporeal. rat i OM 1 creature; what the real essence or other quath Ie,
of that creature are In this case, Is no wey COfIsidered. And therefore,
whether a child or a changeling be a maR in a physical sense, may amongst
the naturaltats be disputable as I t wi II, It cenc;erns not at all lithe
moral man," as I call hl_" which Is this 100000vable. unchangeable Idea. a
corpo .... l. rat lonal be'ltg.iS
It Is .Iso evident, as '_tanced by the exanpl., that Locke looks upon

huraen nature. even In t.he

lsax.

as the founctation for natura. I.. arad morality

26Cf • the dIscussion of this on page )0 of this thesis.
27...url "

Cranston, John f,9Ske:

28!! IsseX. Itl. 9. 16.

~ BI2IrMbY (New York, 1957). ,. 66.
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~hls passage also lends further weight to the consi$ten~y of Locke IS tIl inking ..
~....n nature, then, would certainly seem to be for Locke .. the foundation and
~nn

of natural law.

But. unfortunate I y .. in the ea r 1y essays Locke did not make th i 5 po 1nt
~Iear,

and von Leyden seizes upon the mistake.

~tion

arising from the law of nature will suffer because of this, too.

~rgt.l1leRt

Locke's argument for the obil-

on obi I gat ,on appears in the sixth esMY.

~Is p~f

His

It slatply develops further

given in the fourth essay.

The natural law is bindIng on all men primarily and of .tself llbeceuse this

~aw eoRtalns a.l1
~

that Is necessary to make a I.., binding: H29

superIor will to wh<:m we are rightly subject I. needed.

~uperlor

~re

will;

But God is the

and we are subject t.o Him out of Justice, sInce we owe all we

to HIli, and out of necessIty, since ~r very continuance in exlstenee de-

~s on Hlm;'O (b) For obUgatlon.
~s.

(a) For obi 19ation

the superior's will GUlst be made known to

But God's wi 11 Is made known to us through natural lew.

pf our facuhles will disclose this to us.

This

WlUi

The proper U$e

shown to be true In the

Ifourth essay_
uThe resu J, t
~t'on

15

that,

5

i nee nothl ng e I Ie is requ i red to Irnpose an ob 11-

but the authority and rightful power of the one who corrmands and the dis-

~losure

of hIs will, no one can doubt that the law of nature is blnd!"g on al1

1aen.1I31
Von Leyden challenges tofn conclUSion.

29Esu;a, p. 187.

-

lO'bld.

And in doing so, he introduces a
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~istinetlon which prejudices Locke's \il/hole account of the matter.

We say

'prejudices" because, although Locke's inaccuracy of expression might Justify
him with his own wI)rds, his Intention. as the complete context wi II

~tchln9

~lOW.
~Ion

is corta in I y not to use two separate sources 'Of ob II gat ion.

whidl von Leyden insists

Pbl igations
~l

00,

The d ist I ne-

divides obi igatlons into what he calls moral

and natural obJ i gat ions:

l'Thus_ on the one hand, there are mora)

igatlons which are binding because they arise fr'Om the <:OI111I8nds of a superior

11tH,

which as Loeke puts it, is the formal cause of all obligation.

On the

:>ti1er hand. there are natural 'ObligatIons which are binding because they arise
Fran man's nature, whIch as we might say, is the material cause of obI fgat 10n.,J2

On the basis of these two types of obllgati'On, von Leyden finds Locke torn
~tween

(I)

two Incompatible theories regarding obligation.

The two theories are:

the voluntarist theory In Which a thing is right because God coowands It,

!lAd (2) the Intellectualist theory, where 1_ has its foundation In the nature

i)f thIngs "and Is

!lli!!

fndep!nden!

2! illl.. u33

Von Leyden's treatment 'Of this

Indicates that these two poSitions are the horns of en Insoluble dilemlila.
Io.ocke. according to von Leyden, begGn by holding the voluntarist theory where
\;00 obligatl'Ons would be moral obli!)8ttons, and then shifted to the lntelleetuaiist theory where obligations are natural obligations.

\'00 Leyden ad.111ts, at

loast, that Locke attempts ato reach a poSition midway between these two the!)'"

,165.,,34
fr(:~n von

321bJ.d •• p. 50.

This is

33'bld., p. 51.

Italics not in the original.

341b,t4_

Leydent!) hlstroch.u;;t:ion.

Von leyden fl rst exa.llines !:1Orai obi i gat ions, Sha.1ing how ntoo obi igation
here is u1t 'mate 1y founded in God. in the natura 1 r i gilt wh Ien the Crector has

over His eraation ...3S

In short, God's will does too obliging-

But von

Leyden believes that by the seventh essay Locke hcls definitely shifted to the
Intellectualist theory.

'lWhat he (Locke) Is attempting now Is to gtve an al-

ternative explanation and to arrive at a purely rationel foundation of ethics.
He cons I ders mora I ru Ias to 00 va lid independent i y

oi~

any

COimland

or externa 1

cause. 1'3C~
Certainly Lock.e wishes to emphasize In the seventn essay the discovery of
obi igatlon and the prec:epts of natural law as rooted in human nature.
this a Hpurely rational founciation ll '/

depend on an unstable

8i'ld

But is

When Locke states tnat IIthis law does not

c:hangoabJe wi II, but on toe eternal order of things,nl

we have no right to c:oneiude, as von Leyden cioes" that he is making law inde-

pendent of goetts will. or lIindependent of !!!.X, ccmmand or external eausc. H
God's wi 11 Is not unstable and changeable..

being ;Ithe eternal order of things."

He Is the one who brought into

I..oc:ke nhnseU certainly has no intent,ioo

of excluding God when referring t.o the eternal order of thIngs.

For after not ...

ing that man IS nature Is such that c:ertain duties. CBnnot be other than they
loc:ke states:

ar(t,~

"And this is not because nature or God (as • should say) could

not have created man d I fferont i y.

Rather the CflIJ$e

i;J

that. S i nee man has been

;:iade suc:h as he Is • • • • there necessarily resuit from his Inborn c:onstitution

35'bh! •• p. 50.
36
p. 52.
~

..

37.l~tq .• p. 199.

70
""-.:-')

saoo definite duties for him. II .)"}

God could have created sOinGthlng in plaee of man's nature.
has "'Ii lied His creation, it stands uilC.Mngeaole.

Truth.
at

\.'I

But once God

For He is eternal. unehanging

Locke has taken an alternative approocll, it is true. but not to arrive.

purely rational foundation of ethics in the sense in which von leyden uses

these words, as indopendent of God's wi 11 and found bV a c051slderation of human

nature alone.
Von Leyden's final query, then, places aJ', illegitimate question when he
1IH<M, then, does Locke answer the question:

asks:

What preciselv is there tl1

human nature that by itself csn give natural 1.1f its binding force'I 1139

If llin

human natural! and Ilby itself" iooans disconnected fro;n God's wi 1J and purpose,

aut Loe!<e is not trying to found obI igatlon on

the answer Is nothing.

thln9 divorced froll Goo's wO I.

What he indicates rather is that iQ.d't

rlianifosts itself in the law arising out of the very nature of man as
reason.

SO!llI;':l!-

!lll

kllOWll

God's wi 11 is not &Omething superimposed erbit rari lyon man.

by

It is

r<lti1er, as Loek.e has told us DB along, ordered in a ;"IaY :lsuitable to man's

nature,!!

50

that it is right to say sim:! tanaltus.ly that natural law is binding

because God wills it and because It Is gfOurtded in human nature.
the law by creating

lilan

\\fith e reason capable of

k~lng

God willed

what is demanded or

excluded by human nature.
I..oeke, unfortunate I y, has not made such a connec.t i on between hi s d i f fe rent

38.l£l<!.
39 IbJd •• p.

51-+.

71
explanations quite so e.x.plicit.

But that he Is laboriniJ to explain the natura

law In this way has even been admitted by von Leyden.
IV)

41.)

The fourth stage of Locke's pr00f considars the universality and per

petuity of the law of ootUN.

We need oniy to c;oosider It in reference to von

t.eydanls objections ond to (,laintaln his division.

When von leyden turns to

tilis section of his analysis, the matter contained in the seventh essay, he j>re
supposes the uua I exp) anut i on proposed above, and he ussuras us that Loche IS

final chotce rests with

too

Intellectualist theory.

The conc:lusionsroochacl

by Locke In this section are categorized by von leyden as a fourth type of pro"

position. logical truths.

This final cl inglng to the rational horn of the eli lemma secures for Locke.
according to von Leyden. his conviction that moml conclusions are de,.. ved from
"",,nises with just as much certainty as _thai1'l8tlcal truths.

seems to

fie

1I1n fact, it

to fol1ow just as necessarily fr<n the nature of man that. if he is

man, he Is bound to love and worshIp God, .... as it follows from the nature

a triangle that. If It Is a triangle, Its
41
angles. 1I

th~

angles are equal to two right

With _thematlc5 the reasoning starts from the nature and property

of fIgures end nur.tbers;

in the case of morality, It starts fran the idea of

man as a ratlonel creature.
Von leyden's criticism of this indicates again hh whole lIne of thought.
Even if moral propositions could be used in deduction, he te11s us, ',nora;
obligations could sti II be regarded as a kind of _eessity differing froo

4Ovon Leyden COOkrtents tllat locke "attempts to reach a posl tion midway be"
tween these two thear i es. II Essa¥.~. p. 51.
41

0

~ssaYS,

p. 199.

These are lockets words.
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logical necessity as It does
told, why Locke t.ried to

fr~.,:n causa'

s~ the

42
necosslty.u

p"'lssibi 1 ity

~yf

The

rooson~ we

deductive Inference

\.,.5

ere

Has

though he feared that unless ethics could be sha.fn to be grounded In God's wi 11

2.t to adult of mathematica' demonstration. natural law night appear as a Illere

l!!

indlcatf~a.

i.e. Indicating but not binding men to, moral rules. 1I43

(Note

agaIn von Leyden's forced disjunction between (',od's wltl and natural demon-

stration.)

The reason, according

to von Leyden. why Locke did not rest obI i-

gaUon on God's will was that "for sonte rGO.u;on Locke considered the voluntarist
theory as not altogether $<ltisfactory; . perhaps he felt that It was too

000"

sided a doetrtne and that a.ong with the concept of wi 11 It introduced an e10ment of arbitrariness into moral ity."

~

Hence, locke introduced the tdM of

a body of rules In confonnity45 with rational nature to stand Side by side with
the idea of natural

18\'1

as the will of God.

Moreover. says von Leyden, these
46

two accounts "must have seemed to locke to be c:.onpatible. 1I

Von Leyden. however, sees only conft Ict in the two theories.

He

goes on

to Instance several expressions of Locke whIch apparently manifest this eon-

For example, fron Locke's phrase which refers the ground of obedience

flict.

42 lbid ., p. 55.

-

~, ,0')

(.t';,>

l

!

Ibid •• p. 56.

-

The word

1101""

not ital iclz.ed in the ortglnal.

++'bld.

4'-

~Confonnlty with rational nature See"I1S to mean for von leyden merely something that "goes well t'~itf1n hWilan nature.
tonfof"lrlity. !1fMever. is int.endod in
a stronger sense of IIbelonging to the very nature of: a thing to act in such Ii

w(Jy. 1I

46

Essal~.J p.

S6.
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to the law of nature as a "rational apprehension of what is right,)+1 von Leyder,
infers that:

flit

would follaN frQU this that right and wrong are independent of

the wi I i of God and that 1tis not tauto Iogous to say of an act i on calTllanded by
God that i t ' 5 rl ght or good.1I

4~~

~.

The root of von Leyden's difficulty

~~S

boen discussed earlier.

4)

The

difficulty lies with a confused notion about the way in which God decreed the
Perhaps, too. a mistaken idea of God's wi)) underl ies the di ffi-

natural law.

God's will is not arbitrary but IS guided by His intellect.

culty.

the very nature of a will so to act.
an i rrat ions} thing_

It Is in

If this wore not so, God's will would be

The naturos of all exi sti n9 things are reflections of Hh

essence which might or might not have been brought into <a'tistencej

oot independent entities.

but they arc

Consequently, man's nature, since it is simply a

participation in God's essenee, is not a separate nonu distinct from the decrees
It Is precisely human nature, with its special ordination to God. and

of God.

its speCial way of reaching God .. t:'lat God wi lIed into existence.

In willing

that nature. God had to wi 11 whatever belonged necessarn ly to that nature, including the necessary relations and obligations arising from such a nature.

His decree was for man to exist and to Jive according to his nature;
quently. to

obser~e

conse'"

the law arising from that nature, which is the natural law.

Ef we view Locke's argument now as a whole, it is apparent that it is far

from satisfactory.

471~!!!. t

But neither is It the weak thing that von Leydan depicted

p. 185.

48

tbld., p. 57.
49 • page 65 of
Cf

the thesis.

I t to be.
~$

Von Leyden f I ra t s I n91 eO out Loel<e· s observat Ion t hat man can reason

his starting point.

This missed Lockeia own initial stress on God's ex-

istence and governance of the world, with the result that It put Locke's argu"
~nt

In the wrong light fran the beginning.

~akens

pf

By doing this von !..eyden also

Locke's teleological explanation of man and lays him open to the charge

lnaklng transitions fron factual statements to ethical conclusions without

~ustlflcation.
~ture

The truth Is that man is obi 1ged by the rules he discerns in hil

because he perceives thetr necessary connoc:tion with an end which is of

~bsolute

moral necessity_

Then, besides missing the obligation implicit In

p.ocke's teleological developnent, when he treats fon-really of obi igetion. von
,..eyden forces a false dilerrma upon Locke which renders his argument actually in-

Ponsistent.
~riticizes

Then finally, by choosing the intellectualist theory for Locke. he
him for moving again from a logical necessity, a factual "is", to a

"""ral necessity, an ethical l'ought".

If the text of Lockels essays is carefuUy studied, a thread of argume:nt
far more consistent than von leyden would allow reveals 1tseU.
the criticism of these essay!' as "second-rate qual ity"

muddl~t51, Locke has offered a'fairly accurate

50 and as "confused and

and valid argument for the eK-

lstence, knowabi 1 Ity, and binding force of the natural lew.

presentation leads easily to misinterpretation;

For. despite

Admittedly his

the conflict between his volun-

taristic and intellectualistic approaches are reconciled more by the accidental

SOD. J. Allan, IIReviow of Essays," Philo$Opt'!.x. XX (April. 1956), p. J84.
51p. G. Lucas, IIDJscussion:
(April J 1956). p. 174.

John locke.'

1ho

PhilosoPhical 2.u,arter1..x. VI

75
'raction towards which his prudence led than by his actual expression of a
He used only a handful of words, sense, reason. obligation.
:115 position.

This, of courso, is arritating and inexcusable

a modern age accustoned to careful distinctions and \fIOrd analysis.
ression is weak.

His insight Into truth, however, Is not.

Loc:ke's

Overlooking

:aany details, we can cone I ude that subs tant i a II y the argument and doct r I ne of
he

i,5aYS 2!l!!l!

L_

2f.

Nature show a basic consistency with Locke's later and

re mature thought, and at least .. reasonable validity In themselves.
Th I s I nqu I ry was notund.rtaken to unve, i the d. 5eovery of a new aoo proounder exposition of natural

1&'#

doetrine.

Out tile investigation does cast

light on the menta) journeys of a great philosopher. a philosopher whose

c;;trhle of the natural law hos had profound historical signi ficancc. particu·

1arly in this country.

The Investigation reveals a far daeper consistency be-

ItWlsen Locke the empiricist and Locke the rationalist than has been historically
ranted;

and It makes elear Lockets concern for mora) problems.

re more than an "added" work of Locke's.
han

Just. corner of Locke'. thought.

lIosophy.

The essays

The doctrine of natural law is more
It stands In the center of his whole

In his search for e practical political theory, In his search for

demonstrable ethics, In his InvestigatIon of the theory of knowing. his conern for man's conckH;t and morality is uppermost.

And despite his apparent

.eaning to hedonism. and hls fuJ Jer writing on the law of fashion, from the
rly essays to his last works his conviction is unshaken that the law of na'cure
lis the only true touchstone of moral rectitude. uS!
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